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ABSTRACT

This study examines the decision of local governments to conduct
municipal solid waste (MSW) planning and management independently or
cooperatively.

First, the research develops a theoretical framework

in which

the decision process of local governments may be examined, drawing upon
economic theory as well as other social science disciplines.

According to

the theoretical model developed, a governmental unit first selects optimal
levels of choice characteristics,
maximize utility.

conditioned upon own characteristics,

that

The unit then compares the resulting optimal utility to

utility levels achievable with alternative feasible arrangements for provision
of MSW planning and management, to select the feasible arrangement that
minimizes the difference from optimal utility.
involves multijurisdictional

If the optimal feasible strategy

cooperation and the same outcome is not

selected as optimal by all potential cooperating partners, then the unit must
engage in a negotiation process to achieve an outcome that maximizes
utility of all participants simultaneously.
This theory is then examined using data from Tennessee, where
recent legislation required all counties to form either a single or multi-county

iii

solid waste region. The legislation also established a minimum service level
for MSW services, and required all regions to develop a comprehensive

plan

for meeting minimum service level restrictions.
First, regionalization decisions and the resulting management of MSW
are examined through five in-depth case studies of solid waste regions in
Tennessee.

Results of the case studies indicate that cooperation in the

management of MSW is facilitated when potential operational cost savings
due to economies of scale in disposal are not only available, but also
effectively

communicated and widely accepted.

Cooperation is also

facilitated by a reduction in transaction costs which can be achieved
through past cooperative efforts, presence of a cooperation entrepreneur,
institutional

arrangements that serve as a cooperation cornerstone,

of bond creating the region, and some private sector influences.

the type

Other

factors that heavily influence decisions and outcomes are the autonomy risk
and political risk associated (or perceived to be associated) with
cooperation.

Finally, the degree to which a service level constraint or

budget constraint is binding influences cooperation decisions.
The theory and case studies then contributed toward development of
statistical models designed to predict the decision Tennessee counties made
in 1991 regarding solid waste region formation.

iv

The models showed that

multi-county

cooperation was more likely to be observed if neighboring

counties had a low population, the county and its neighbors were more
urban, the county had a large county commission, the county currently
managed a small percentage of its generated waste, and the county did not
have a Subtitle D landfill or firm plans to construct a Subtitle D landfill.
model predicted the outcome with 72% accuracy, and by far, the most
significant influence on the decision was the presence of a Subtitle D
landfill.

V
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Municipal solid waste (MSW) refers to a specific portion of the
generated waste stream, primarily solid waste generated by residential,
commercial, institutional,

and some industrial sources.

MSW includes

wastes such as durable goods, nondurable goods, containers and
packaging, food scraps, yard trimmings, and miscellaneous inorganic
wastes.

MSW does not include wastes from other sources, such as

construction

and demolition wastes, automobile bodies, municipal sludges,

combustion ash, and industrial process wastes that might also be disposed
in municipal waste landfills or incinerators.

MSW does not include

hazardous wastes, as defined by amendments to the Resource Conservation
and Recovery Act.
products (38%).

The largest component of MSW is paper and paperboard
Residential wastes (including wastes from multi-family

dwellings) are estimated to be 55 to 65 percent of total generation, with
commercial wastes ranging between 35 and 45 percent of generation
(USEPA, 1994).
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V

In 1993, the United States Environmental Protection Agency (USEPA)
estimated that 207 million tons, or 4.4 pounds per person per day, of MSW
were generated (USEPA, 1994).

Management of MSW has traditionally

been the responsibility of individual local governments.

However, several

factors have significantly increased the cost and complexity of MSW
management, causing local governments, especially rural counties and small
communities, to consider cooperating with other independent governments
to jointly provide MSW management.

In fact, over the last eight years,

many states have implemented state planning requirements encouraging or
even mandating local governments to consider forming regional cooperative
efforts for MSW management.

These same factors have also caused local

governments to look toward private firms as an option for management of
MSW. As technologies and capital requirements of managing MSW have
changed, the private sector has also aggressively pursued consideration of
large scale facilities to serve broader regions.

1 . RISING DISPOSAL COSTS
The major catalyst for consideration of cooperative efforts in MSW
management has been "Subtitle D" regulations regarding MSW landfills.
While MSW management is much broader than landfill disposal, landfilling
remains the primary disposal method.

In 1993, 20 percent of MSW

generated was recovered for recycling or composting,
2

13 percent was

processed at combustion facilities, and the remaining 67 percent was sent
to landfills (USEPA, 1994).

For most local governments, disposal costs

represent a large percentage of MSW management expenditures.

Subtitle D

is a generic term referring to the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
regulations for MSW landfills under Subtitle D of the Resource Conservation
and Recovery Act of 1991

1

.

location, design, construction,

Subtitle D regulations specify criteria for the
operation, monitoring, closure, and post

closure monitoring of both public and private landfills.

The result is

expected to be safer disposal of MSW for the environment and for human
health, and a significant increase in the cost of landfilling.
project the cost of landfilling will increase 400%-900%

Some estimates

over 1991 levels by

the end of the 1990's.
Most landfills have typically been small, publicly owned, low
technology,

and located in rural areas. New EPA requirements for landfill

design and operation require that most existing facilities be replaced or

1

The United States Congress passed the Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act (RCRA) in 1976. RCRA was amended in 1984 and the EPA
was directed to develop new regulations for the disposal of non-hazardous
solid waste, as described in Subtitle D of RCRA. The regulations were
promulgated in October 1991 to be effective October 9, 1993. The date
was later changed for smaller landfills to April 9, 1994. However,
extensions and allowances for vertical expansion in an existing landfill
"footprint" essentially extended the deadline for compliance to October 9,
1996. While most landfill owners/operators are anticipating unilateral
compliance by October 1996, some uncertainty still exists as to potential
variances that may be granted by EPA.

3

extensively redesigned.

Most facilities that have opened since 1991 have

been much larger and often located near population centers (Steuteville,
1995a).

Because rural areas have less money, less managerial expertise,

limited access to technology,

insufficient information about solid waste

management options, and less decision-making influence at the policy level
than do urban areas, they are particularly challenged by the Subtitle D
legislation (Malia and Morrissey, 1994).

As these rural communities are

forced to close landfills not compliant with Subtitle D, one option to
consider is cooperation with neighboring communities in a similar situation
to exploit the potential economies of scale that might be gained by jointly
constructing

and operating a landfill compliant with Subtitle D.

Landfills have traditionally

handled nearly all collected MSW.

Landfilling is still the predominant method of managing MSW, but its share
has fallen from 80% in 1989 to 67% in 1994 (Steuteville, 1995a).

As

landfilling becomes an increasingly expensive way to dispose of MSW, other
disposal alternatives are becoming economically and politically competitive
and new technologies are being developed.

This also contributes to the

regionalization trend because many disposal alternatives such as waste to
energy incineration or mixed waste composting require a large volume of
waste to operate efficiently.

One way to achieve a large volume is through

the cooperative efforts of several individual small governmental

4

units.

2. WASTE REDUCTION, RECYCLING, AND PLANNING REQUIREMENTS
In the late eighties and early nineties, declining disposal capacity,
increasing cost of developing and operating new landfills, and increasing
citizen pressure in siting new disposal facilities contributed to a "landfill
crisis" mentality.

High-profile images such as the floating garbage barge in

the Northeast U.S. further heightened citizen perception of the landfill crisis,
which was characterized by a public image that the nation was running out

pressure and in an effort to assure future disposal capacity, 44 states
passed recycling laws, or adopted recycling, diversion, or waste reduction
goals between 1988 and 1993 (Steuteville, 1995b)

2

•

A large volume of

recyclables is generally required to make collection, processing, marketing,
and transportation

of materials economically feasible (Steuteville, 1995b).

These volume requirements often exceed the amount collected (and often
generated) by individual communities, but joint provision of some or all
recycling services, especially intermediate processing and marketing, may
ease some of the financial pressure of complying with new recycling or
reduction requirements.

2

Diversion goals generally include recycling, composting and source
reduction. Waste diversion generally requires a reduction in volume from
disposal facilities, usually from a baseline year.
5

Also in response to the landfill crisis, a number of states have passed
comprehensive waste management legislation requiring development of a
long-term, detailed plan for the management of MSW. As part of
comprehensive waste management legislation, many states included
incentives, provisions, and/or mandates for formation of solid waste
planning regions to encourage small counties and communities to take
advantage of potential economies of scale associated with many aspects of
MSW management, including major projects such as developing state-of-

marketing recyclables or in intermediate processing of recyclables.

Other

advantages of regional cooperation that make it attractive in states with
comprehensive MSW management planning requirements include greater
leverage in obtaining necessary financial resources, greater flexibility
management technology options, and often environmental
due to the economic feasibility of state-of-the-art

in

improvements

technologies

(EPA, 1994).

3. RESEARCH OBJECTIVES
As both voluntary and mandated MSW management planning has
intensified, it has become evident that relatively few local governments are
actually forming multijurisdictional

cooperation regions to plan for MSW

management, despite significant potential economies of scale cost savings,
as well as other advantages.

The overall objective of this research is to

6

examine the decision of local governments to conduct MSW planning and
management independently or cooperatively.

Specific objectives of this

research are:
( 1)

To develop a theoretical framework in which the decision
process of local governments may be examined, drawing upon
economic theory as well as other social science disciplines.

(2)

To develop in-depth case studies of selected solid waste
regions to examine the cooperation decision process, the
outcome, and the implications for solid waste management.

(3)

To develop statistical models that examine the decision
local governments made in response to state legislation
requiring formation of solid waste regions.

To achieve the second and third objectives, the situation of solid waste
management in Tennessee provides a rich resource through which in-depth
research may be accomplished.

In 1991, Tennessee enacted

comprehensive solid waste management legislation that required each
county in the state to develop a plan for achieving solid waste goals and
requirements.

As a first step in plan development, each county was

required to form a solid waste region, with a single county the minimum
acceptable size. Statutory language, monetary incentives, and technical
advisors all encouraged counties to form multi-county

regions. Tennessee's

Division of Solid Waste Assistance, in the Tennessee Department of
7

Environment and Conservation, has made relevant data available to facilitate
research and understanding of multijurisdictional

coo eration in s Ii waste

management.
The remainder of this report is structured as follows.

The next

chapter provides a review of literature examining alternative theoretical
frameworks

in which a cooperation decision may be examined.

Also

reviewed is research focusing on elements of the cooperation decision in the
management of MSW, as well as for the provision of other services.
Chapter Ill proposes a theoretical framework in which factors affecting the
cooperation decision are identified and the cooperation decision is
examined.

A random utility framework allows one to examine the optimal

levels of solid waste services, autonomy risk, political risk, and other goods
and services that a utility maximizing county will choose.

The decision

making county selects desirable levels of other counties' characteristics

in

an effort to take advantages of potential economies of scale cost savings
associated with cooperation, while balancing benefits with potential costs
associated with cooperation in the form of transaction costs, autonomy risk
and political risk. The theory also emphasizes the dynamic nature of
cooperation, where the outcome is dependent upon interaction among
individual units.
Given the complex and specific nature of cooperation in solid waste
management, a logical first step is to approach the problem through analysis

8

of individual cases. Thus, implications of the theory are then explored
through five in-depth case studies of solid waste regions formed in
Tennessee in 1992. These case studies are presented in Chapter IV. Each
case is analyzed with respect to cooperation in both planning and managing
MSW. As a complement to this qualitative analysis, an attempt was made
to test the theory through quantitative analysis.

However, the only

dimension of cooperation in Tennessee that can actually be statistically
analyzed is that of the decision made to form a single-county or multi
county solid waste region to develop a ten-year solid waste management
plan, as required by state legislation.

Thus the theory and insights gained

from the case studies is then applied in Chapter V to development of two
statistical models designed to predict this decision by Tennessee counties.
Finally, Chapter VI provides a summary of the research and links findings
from the case studies and the statistical models to the theoretical model.
The final chapter also discusses policy implications of this research.

9

CHAPTER II

REVIEW OF LITERATURE

There are a number of frameworks within economic literature, and
also some complementary

perspectives from other social sciences, that

provide a construct for looking at decisions of communities or jurisdictional
units to cooperate in the provision and/or production of goods and services.
These include economic theories of clubs, game theory, and process
theories of collaboration and coordination from organizational behavior and
public administration.

Additional perspectives may be gained through the

disciplines of sociology, political science, and planning.

While no single

theory of cooperation has emerged that is able to capture all facets of the
decision-making

process for the case of waste management, aspects of

each may contribute to development of a framework able to conceptualize
the decision

process.

1 . EXCHANGE THEORY
Regional cooperation in MSW management is characterized by both
benefits and costs.

Thus the framework of exchange theory is perhaps the

10

most popular perspective on cooperative behavior.

In exchange theory,

cooperation is a voluntary outcome occurring when benefits exceed costs.
Cooperation arises when no potential cooperative partners are made worse
off through cooperation, and at least one cooperative partner is made better
off, i.e., cooperation exhibits a Pareto improvement over individual
provision.

While this framework is quite plausible, it is not without criticism.

The first major criticism is that the framework of exchange theory is so
abstract that it is difficult to connect operationally to actual behavior (Weiss,
1987).

There are many benefits and many costs associated with

cooperation, and many of these costs and benefits are not valued directly
by markets, making comparison and cost-benefit analysis difficult.

In

addition, it is "especially difficult to avoid the tautological conclusion that if
agencies did cooperate, the reason must be that the benefits of the
transaction exceeded the costs; the research task then becomes the defense
of the axiom (Weiss, 1987)."

A second major drawback of exchange theory

lies in the static nature of cost-benefit comparisons.

The only

considerations in explaining cooperative behavior are static equilibrium
outcomes before and after cooperation.

A major contribution

of social

sciences outside economics is that cooperation is in fact a dynamic process
(Cigler, 1992 ; Gray, 1989; Weiss, 1987).

Thus we will consider less

abstract economic frameworks for cooperative behavior, as well as

11

contributions

that focus on the dynamic nature of the cooperative process

from other social science disciplines.

2. CLUB THEORY
One possible economic framework in which a decision to cooperate
may be cast is that of club theory.

A large volume of literature exists

examining and applying the economic theory of clubs, where a club is "a
voluntary group deriving mutual benefit from sharing one or more of the
following:

production costs, the members' characteristics,

or a good

characterized by excludable benefits (Cornes and Sandler, 1986)."

In the

basic club model, a representative member's taste is represented by a utility
function composed of consumption of some private good, consumption of
the club good, and the club membership size. Each member attempts to
maximize utility subject to a resource constraint, which depends on the level
of the two goods used and the overall club membership size. Club theory
provides a theoretical foundation for the study of allocative efficiency of
impure public goods (Sandler and Tschirhart,
was an early pioneer of club investigation,

1980).

Mancur Olson, Jr.

recognizing that clubs would

form to exploit economies of scale and to share public goods (Olson, 1965).
James Buchanan also contributed to the early development of club theory
by formalizing provision and membership conditions for clubs sharing impure
public goods (Buchanan, 1965).

Club theory requires that the provision and

12

membership conditions (and toll condition, if the good is characterized by
congestion) be derived simultaneously.
One may consider an individual government's

decision to join s other

governments to jointly develop MSW management analogous to the decision
to join a "club" of size s, where the shared club good is regional MSW
management.

However, recall that the club model requires that provision

and membership decisions be determined simultaneously.

Thus, for MSW

management to be considered a pure club good requires that the
jurisdictional
utility.

unit choose the level of provision that maximizes individual

Under circumstances of state-mandated minimum provision

requirements (as is the case in 44 states), individual counties or
communities do not choose the level of the "club good" that maximizes
utility; rather minimum requirements are set forth in legislation or
regulations.

It is plausible to think this level of MSW management service

(i.e., the level of provision of the club good) is above the utility-maximizing
level a local government would choose independently,

since long-term MSW

planning was virtually non-existent prior to legislative mandate.

Since

individual governments are constrained in choosing the level of provision of
the club good as applied to MSW management planning, a pure club model
may be inappropriate for examining the cooperation decision of local
governments in the provision of MSW management planning.

13

3. TIEBOUT MODEL
A variation of a club model, the Tiebout model of local provision of
public goods, attempts to show how jurisdictional size of local governments
could be determined by voluntary mobility decisions, or "voting with the
feet" (Tiebout, 1956).

The model describes a sorting of consumers into an

array of suburban communities that differ according to their public good and
tax combinations.

Based on Miceli's (1993) application of the Tiebout

model to regionalization in the provision of education, DeBoer (1995) models
a county's decision to form a multi-county

region to develop a solid waste

management plan as a tradeoff between cost savings and loss of autonomy.
Each community chooses a tax rate and level of service that will maximize
individual utility subject to a budget constraint.

An alternative is for a

community to cooperate with another and jointly provide solid waste
management.

In the case of cooperation, the community

individual budget constraint,
communities,
community.

no longer faces an

but a joint budget constraint of the cooperating

which will differ in slope from that faced by a single
If the slope of the cooperative constraint is less than the

individual constraint, then the community may attain a higher level of utility.
Cooperation is efficient if the slope of each community's

cooperative

constraint is less than the slope of their independent constraint,
allows each community to increase their utility.

which

However, when a

community joins another in provision of the service, the tax rate/service
14

level decision is no longer made independently,

but jointly.

Thus, the

community trades autonomy for cost savings.
DeBoer identifies a "cooperation range" of tax rates and service
levels, which is influenced by the similarity of the two communities'
indifference curves.

DeBoer hypothesizes that 1) communities with a higher

per capita tax base are less likely to cooperate in service delivery than are
communities with a lower per capita tax base, 2) the likelihood that a
community will jointly provide a service is positively related to potential
economies of scale cost reductions, and 3) communities with similar
preferences are more likely to cooperate.
Statistical testing of the cooperation decision of Indiana counties
reveals that the inverse relationship between county size and potential
economies of scale encourages smaller counties to cooperate.

Other factors

that encourage cooperation include existing zoning restrictions,

which may

cause a county to feel it is retaining authority despite cooperation, and small
income differences of neighboring counties, which may indicate similarity of
preferences.

The existence of a landfill in a county decreased the

probability of cooperating to provide MSW management.

While loss of

autonomy and cost savings have been shown to influence the cooperation
decision, a more general model would allow consideration of a broader
range of factors that may influence the decision to cooperate.
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For example,

loss of autonomy may not be the only "cost" offsetting

benefits of

cooperation.

4. GAME THEORY
An alternative construct often applied to club goods is that of game
theory.

N-person game theory, developed by John von Neumann and Oskar

Morgenstern (1944), provides a natural formulation of club problems
(Sandler and Tschirhart,

1980).

In game theory, players have an incentive

to form coalitions because of the payoffs available from playing the game.
In club theory, members form clubs to partake of the available benefits.
characteristic

The

function used in game theory indicates the "total net benefit

available to all potential coalitions of players and can be used in club theory
with some modification

(Sandler and Tschirhart,

1980)."

Generally, the cooperation decision of individual counties could be
cast into a game theory framework by assuming each county is a player and
is considered for all possible partitions of the population (all counties) into
multiple clubs.

Each "player" compares his characteristic

possible partitions and voluntary membership/defection
solution is achieved.

function in all

occur until a core

"The core of an n-person game is the set of feasible

outcomes that cannot be improved upon by any coalition of players
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(Shapley, 1971).

1

"

Once a core solution is achieved, the solution is stable

since no player will be made better off by defect, and no player will be
made better off by blocking a coalition.

Thus, a game theory formulation

allows for a determination of the optimum number of clubs and their stability
of composition.
While determination of an optimum number of stable coalitions is
highly desirable, several drawbacks to empirically applying game theory
must be considered.
function.

The first of these is formulation of the characteristic

A characteristic function would have to be developed for all

possible coalitions of players.

Recall that the characteristic

function is

essentially a "net benefit" calculation, and many of the costs and benefits of
cooperation are not easily quantified.

Even if the characteristic

functions

could reasonably be calculated, the number of calculations required would
make empirics difficult.

As an example, if we limited coalitions to

contiguous counties and one county touched four neighboring counties, that
county's potential coalitions with the other four counties only number 31,
and this would be only a fraction of possible coalitions involving that
county.

Thus to compute characteristic functions for all possible coalitions

of almost 100 counties would be empirically cumbersome, if not impossible.

1

The core is a less general solution than a Pareto optimum, since a partition
may be Pareto optimal but not in the core, whereas a partition in the core is
always Pareto optimal (Cornes and Sandler, 1986).
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Despite this drawback, a further criticism results from the nature of the
"players" of a cooperation game. Counties are heterogeneous, which
implies formation of "mixed" clubs, as opposed to homogeneous clubs.

In

the case of mixed clubs, or coalitions, a solution exists only under very
restrictive assumptions.

5. NEGOTIATED ORDER THEORY
The major contribution

of other social sciences examining cooperation

is recognition of the dynamic process nature of cooperation (other
terminology

included "collaboration"

and "coordination").

From an

organizational behavior perspective, Barbara Gray ( 1989) defines
collaboration as a process in which those parties with a stake in the problem
actively seek a mutually determined solution, with a focus on collaboration
as a method.

She states that the objective of collaboration is, "to create a

richer, more comprehensive appreciation of the problem among the
stakeholders than any one of them could construct alone (Gray, 1989)."
Gray develops a theory of collaboration as a negotiated order,
conceptualized as a mechanism by which a new negotiated order emerges
among a set of stakeholders (Gray, 1989).

The negotiated order theory

downplays the notion of organizations as fixed, rather rigid systems which
are highly constrained by strict rules, regulations, goals, and hierarchical
chains of command.

Instead, it views organizations as complex and highly
18

fragile social constructions

of reality which are subject to the numerous

temporal, spatial, and situational events occurring both internally and
externally {Day and Day, 1977).
collaboration process.

Gray identifies five features critical to the

First, the stakeholders must be interdependent,

have a give-and-take relationship.
constructively
involved.

with differences.

and

Second, solutions emerge by dealing
Third, joint ownership of decisions is

Fourth, stakeholders assume collective responsibility for the

future direction of the identified domain.

Finally, collaboration is an

emergent process, rather than a prescribed state of organization.
Thus far, the terms cooperation, coordination, and collaboration have
all been used interchangeably.

However, from a public administration

perspective, Cigler { 1992) places cooperative efforts along a continuum
from networks to cooperation to coordination to collaboration,

where the

intensity of the linkages increases as one moves up along the continuum.
Networks exist primarily for information exchange, with few barriers to
entry or exit, while collaboration generally involves binding commitments
a stable membership.

Mulford and Rogers (1982) use coordination

cooperation to classify static patterns of interorganizational

and

relations.

Cooperation is characterized by informed trade-offs and by attempts to
establish reciprocity in the absence of rules, while coordination
formal institutionalized

refers to

relationships among existing networks of

organizations {Mulford and Rogers, 1982).
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Since no level of cooperative

by

effort in waste management planning has been specified, we will continue
to use "cooperation"

as an inclusive term indicating varying degrees of

cooperative effort ranging from networking to collaboration.
Cigler also identifies pre-conditions for forming rural partnerships
including 1) a catalyst, such as a disaster occurrence, 2) fiscal stress, or the
perception of, by decision-makers, 3) the presence of a political
constituency

for cooperation, or the perception of, 4) supportive programs

provided by external agents, 5) early and continued support of local elected
officials, 6) visible demonstration that the cooperation has advantages, 7)
the emergence of a policy entrepreneur(s), 8) an early focus on visible,
effective strategies, and 9) an emphasis on collaborative skills-building
by/for those involved.

In addition, she identifies a number of factors that

may impede the emergence of rural partnerships.

These can be generally

summarized as lack of various things such as leadership, citizen support,
administrative and technical capacity, priority for action, clear understanding
of alternatives, and clear understanding of associated costs and benefits.
Other factors include dissimilarity between preferences and fiscal situations,
and uncertainty of outcomes.

6. INSTITUTIONAL CONSIDERATIONS
When considering such complex governmental decisions, it is
important to bear in mind the effect of the existing institutional structure on
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the decision process and ultimate decision.

Thus, another perspective on

cooperation may be gained from political science through the theory of
institutionalism.

Elinor Ostrom has defined "institutions"

as, "the sets of

working rules that are used to determine who is eligible to make decisions in
some arena, what actions are allowed or constrained, what aggregation
rules will be used, what procedures must be followed, what information
must or must not be provided, and what payoffs will be assigned to
individuals dependent on their actions (Ostrom, 1989)."

lnstitutionalists

are

interested in how rules affect patterns of interaction among people and how
people build rule configurations
situations (Oakerson, 1990).

(institutions) that are adapted to problematic
Patterns of social interaction (or in this case,

patterns of governmental cooperation) occur in the context of institutional
constraints and opportunities as well as in the context of physical and
technical constraints and opportunities.

Ultimately, the cooperation decision

is limited by, or allowed up to the level of institutional capacity, or the
ability to act collectively.
Institutional analysis focuses upon the creation and modification

of

institutions and conditions that are conducive to or facilitative of institutional
innovation and adaptation.

Existing institutions facilitate or inhibit the

formation of new or modified institutions.

Institutional analysis involves

examination of the way in which ( 1) the nature of the resource base
together with (2) constitutive

institutions (policy regimes - rules used by
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policy makers to enable and constrain public entrepreneurs in forming
operational arrangements) affect (3) patterns of interaction among public
entrepreneurs who create (4) operational institutions.

The contribution

of

examination of institutional arrangements to cooperative decisions may be
summarized by Coleman:

"An institutionally

rich environment is more likely

to be rich in social capital, established relations of trust and reciprocity,
which reduces transaction costs, and rich in public entrepreneurship,

which

implies a willingness to accept the risk of assuming the reasonable short
term costs of working out productive long-term relationships (Coleman,
1987).

7. OTHER CONTRIBUTIONS
Another contribution
choice.

of political science is the theory of rational

Norms and values play a role in influencing potential cooperation.

Norms are expectations about action - one's own action, that of others, or
both- which express what action is right or what action is wrong (Oakerson,
1990).

In rational choice theory, norms constitute constraints within which

choices are made, and are little different from other constraints.
choice theory treats social norms as supra-individual.entities

Rational

that affect the

costs and benefits which individuals (in this case, governments) take into
account when exercising choice (Oakerson, 1990).
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In addition to major contributions
cooperation process contributions,

of theoretical developments and

a number of other studies have been

conducted in the area of waste management, as well as in the provision
and/or production of other services, that may provide insight into factors
that affect the cooperation decision process.

In a presentation of findings

associated with an ongoing national study of multi-community

cooperation

in MSW management, William Park identified twelve factors associated with
progress toward cooperation.

These include 1) a bottom-up initiative with

state and/or regional facilitation;

2) homogeneity among participants;

3)

previous success with cooperation in another area or early small success on
MSW matters; 4) clearly defined and widely accepted potential benefits; 5)
time and flexibility to let process move at own speed and along own course;
6) neutral, respected, and effective third-party

"broker";

7) perception of

equitable board representation; 8) ability of board to deal timely, openly, and
fairly with conflicts; 9) effective public education and participation
respect to sensitive issues; 10) careful attention to distribution
and costs within and among jurisdictions;

with

of benefits

11) sensitivity to matters of

flexibility and consistency; and 12) partnership perspective regarding the
private sector (Park, 1995).
A 1983 national survey of 4,000 contracts between local
governments conducted by the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental
Relations (ACIR) showed that the most frequently cited benefit of
23

-
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cooperation was exploitation of economies o

-

cale. Cooperation was also

undertaken to eliminate duplication of services, and occurred most often if
provision of the service required a large capital investment.

The major

factors cited against the use of interlocal agreements were loss of local
autonomy, followed by inequitable apportionment of costs (Henderson,
1985; ACIR, 1987).

Other studies have also cited various forms of cost

savings as the primary motivation for cooperation.

These include a study on

interlocal cooperation by Honadle (1982) and a study of fire department
mergers in Portland by Pittard (1992).

Other studies have reinforced the

influence of homogeneity of populations, or similarity of preferences,
including studies by Nelson ( 1990) and Ferris and Graddy ( 1988).
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CHAPTER Ill

THEORETICAL MODEL

1. INTRODUCTION
As noted in the review of literature, several alternative theoretical
constructs exist in which the cooperation decision for MSW management
may be framed.
Modifications

These include exchange theory and club theory.

of club theory by use of game theory and the Tiebout

hypothesis are also available.

While all are plausible constructs,

limitations as previously addressed.

all have

When examining alternative theoretical

frameworks for the cooperation decision, it is important to bear in mind that,
( 1) the theoretical model is intended to provide a formal conceptual
framework that allows examination of hypotheses regarding factors
influencing the cooperation decision, and (2) the theory, while rigid enough
to provide a conceptual framework, should also be flexible enough to allow
incorporation of other social science perspectives, such as negotiated order
theory, institutional arrangements, and pre-conditions to cooperation, since
cooperation has been shown to be a process rather than a static state.
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The theory developed has benefitted from a grounded theory
approach, where a grounded theory is one that is inductively derived from
the study of the phenomenon it represents (Glaser and Strauss, 1967;
Strauss, 1987; Strauss and Corbin, 1990).

The theory is "discovered,

developed, and provisionally verified through systematic data collection and
analysis of data pertaining to that phenomenon (Strauss and Corbin, 1990,
p. 23)".

In this case, collection and analysis of qualitative data through case

studies allowed further refinement of theoretical relationships and processes
relating to decision making in forming solid waste regions.

2. UTILITY MAXIMIZATION MODEL
A random utility model provides a rigorous decision framework,

while

allowing incorporation of non-monetary variables into the utility function.
This theory asserts that individual units compare utility across two situations
and make decisions accordingly.

A random utility model allows comparison

of alternative solid waste region arrangements through a comparison of the
associated indirect utility functions.

As a first step in developing the

random utility model, it is necessary to examine each individual unit's utility
maximization problem.

Each unit selects an optimal level of the choice

variables that provides them with maximum utility.

However, in the case of

choosing a solid waste regional arrangement, the utility maximizing
arrangement may not be feasibly available, due to constraints.
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Therefore, a

decision making unit compares each feasible arrangement with their utility
maximizing optimal arrangement and forms a solid waste region that is 1)
feasible, and 2) approaches utility achievable with optimal levels of the
choice variables.
Initially, it is necessary to examine each individual county's
maximization problem.

1

utility

Let each county's preferences be represented by a

utility function, U[X, Y, A, Z], where the county receives utility (or disutility)
from consumption of a vector of goods and services, X; a vector of solid
waste services, Y; an autonomy risk level, A; and a political risk level, Z.
The vector of goods and services X may include services such as education,
police protection, or fire protection, and goods such as roads, parks, or
school buildings.

The vector of solid waste services, Y, may include

disposal services such as landfilling for municipal wastes (Class I landfilling),
landfilling inert wastes such as construction

and demolition wastes (Class IV

landfilling), incineration at a WTE facility, curbside recycling, drop-off
recycling, backyard composting, or mixed-waste composting.
include collection services or education services.

It also may

The vector Y is the entire

solid waste service choice set and includes both public and private service
options.

It is assumed that every county has every service option available

to them.

Solid waste services, Y, may be provided publicly by the county,

1

For simplicity, the theoretical model assumes the base jurisdictional unit to
be a "county", although applicable to other forms of jurisdictional division.
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or the county may contract with a private firm to provide Y. Thus, there
may be a distinction between public and private sources of solid waste
services within the choice set, but no explicit distinction

is necessary

outside the choice set.
The marginal utility of both X and Y are positive:

au > o.

au > o and

-

ax

Both X and Y behave as normal goods, i.e., income and demand

aY

for X and Y are positively related.
Y that behaves normally.

It is important to note that it is the vector

Some particular elements of the choice set may in

fact be inferior, where demand for those elements decreases as income
increases, but the vector behaves normally

2

•

The assumption that Y is a

normal good holds regardless of the way in which provision of Y is
financed

3

•

Another important distinction to make is that the vector Y is

aggregate county solid waste services, not individual household solid waste
services, and the normality assumption pertains to the change in county-

2

As an example, we may expect that as income increases (which for a
county, may be total revenue), demand for convenience centers as a
collection method decreases, but demand for curbside pickup increases. As
income increases, the county, serving the preferences of its member
individuals, is willing to trade off dollars (for more expensive curbside
collection as opposed to drop-off convenience centers) for time (curbside is
more convenient and requires less time than drop-off). If we are valuing the
vector Y by dollars spent on solid waste services, then the overall impact on
Y of an increase in income would still be normal, i.e., Y would increase.
3

The assumption of normality refers only to how the level of Y changes as
income (county revenue) changes. If county revenue increases, all else
being equal, then the county will demand more, not less, solid waste
services.
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level demand for Y resulting from a change in county revenue.

If the level

of county revenue increases, all else equal, the county will demand a higher
level of X and a higher level of Y.
Let A be a continuous variable representing the level of risk a county
faces from a loss of autonomy.

Autonomy risk is a measure of a county's

ability to prevent undesirable solid waste management practices from
occurring within its borders. Autonomy focuses on the portion of county
utility (or, rather, disutility) contributed by the perception of autonomy on
the part of all county residents as a whole.

As a county's autonomy risk

increases, they are less able to dictate solid waste management practices
within their county.

Thus, a higher level of A represents a higher risk of

autonomy loss for a given county.
disutility,

~~

<

o.

Since a loss of autonomy yields

One example of autonomy risk may be the inability to

exercise flow control in Class I landfilling.

If membership in a particular solid

waste region arrangement does not allow a county to exercise flow control,
then that arrangement is characterized by a high A, or a high level of
autonomy risk, as it is perceived by county residents.

The level of Z may be

indirectly influenced by the level of A. Increased autonomy risk is likely to
increase the potential for political risk.
Let Z be a continuous variable representing the level of political risk a
county faces.

Political risk is a measure of the probability of intense political

conflict within the county or between counties.
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While autonomy risk

focuses on a risk perception on the part of all citizens collectively,
risk focuses on the contribution

political

to county utility (disutility) contributed

by

the perception of risk on the part of a small subgroup of elected political
leaders, decision makers, or other interested political figures.

Similar to

autonomy risk, the marginal utility of political risk is negative,

au
az < o.

example of political risk may be siting a landfill in the county.

If a particular

One

regional arrangement is likely to require a county to site a landfill within its
borders, then the associated political risk level for that arrangement would
be high.
Further, define
of characteristics
characteristics

A (

c I c 0 ) and

z

(

c I c 0 ) , where c 0 is an (nx1) vector

of the individual county and C is an (nx1) vector of

associated with the one or more contiguous counties that

represent potential partners for formation of a multi-county
region.

solid waste

Let each element of C, Ci, be a continuous variable corresponding

directly to individual characteristics of each potential cooperative county.
Further, let each Ci be defined such that aaA >
C..l

o and aaz > o, i.e., the
C.l.

levels of autonomy risk and political risk are increasing in Ci. It is important
to bear in mind that Ci is defined conditional upon the own characteristics

of

that county, C0 . So the mapping of a characteristic to Ci may be increasing
or decreasing, depending upon the initial characteristics.

But each Ci is

always defined such that A and Z are increasing in Ci, or increasing the level
of a characteristic

increases the level of autonomy risk and political risk.

30

The vector C may include, but is not limited to, elements such as
population, per capita income, per capita revenue, assessed value, disposal
assurance, past cooperation experience, presence of a cooperation
entrepreneur, distance, highway infrastructure,

tenure of legislative and

executive elected officials, bureaucratic structure, or the state of the current
MSW management system.
For a county with a characteristic vector C0 = [C, 0 , C/,

... , C0 °1,

every alternative arrangement of the characteristic vector of_contiguous
counties, C = [C,, C2 ,

... ,

C0 ], may be mapped to a corresponding

and Z. This may be illustrated with a simple example.
such that

c, represents

rank of A

Assume (n = 1, 2, 3),

a measure of disposal assurance, C2 represents past

cooperative experience, and C3 represents per capita revenue.

Assume that

the county under investigation has long term disposal assurance, no past
cooperative experience, and high revenue per capita.

Conditioned upon

these own characteristics for this county, C, is decreasing in disposal
assurance, C2 is decreasing in past cooperative experience, and C3 is
decreasing in per capita revenue.

So, if an arrangement with characteristics

including no disposal assurance, no past experience, and a low per capita
revenue was under consideration, the county may assign an autonomy risk
rank Ai and a political risk rank Z1• If they were considering another
arrangement with characteristics

including certainty in long term disposal

assurance, numerous successful cooperative experiences, and a very high
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per capita revenue, they may assign an autonomy risk rank Ak and a political
risk rank zm. In this case, Ai> Ak and Z1> zm. That is, the characteristics

of

the first arrangement under consideration cause this arrangement to have a
higher autonomy risk and political risk rank than the second arrangement
under consideration.

Since each element of C is a continuous variable,

there are an infinite number of possible characteristic combinations,

and

thus an infinite number of autonomy risk and political risk rankings.

A

marginal change in any element of Ci yields a corresponding,

but not

necessarily equal, change in the rank of A and Z. For example, a change
from no disposal assurance to certainty in disposal assurance may effect a
substantial reduction in the rank of autonomy risk, but only a moderate
reduction in the rank of political risk, while the presence of a cooperation
entrepreneur may effect a substantial reduction in the rank of political risk,
but a very small reduction in the rank of autonomy risk.
A county allocates expenditures among X and Y, such that
P xx + PY Y = M, where

sources.

px is the price of X, and M is total revenue from all

pY is the price of Y, and is also a function of the characteristics

alternative region arrangements, given the county's own characteristics,
where PY [ E ( Cl

c 0 ),

T( Cl

c 0 )],

and E represents the average operational

costs of providing solid waste services, characterized by economies of
scale, and T represents transaction costs associated with organizing and
administering a decision making unit for the provision and management of
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of

solid waste services. The price of Y is increasing in operational costs, such
t hat --aP Y >

.
o, an d t he price

aE

that,

>

a:Ty

.
.
. transaction
. costs, sue h
o f Y .1s increasing
in

o.

E(C IC0 ) represents average operational costs of providing solid waste
services.

Several elements of Y are characterized by declining average

costs over some range, or economies of scale. One such element is landfill
disposal, where reductions in average cost are achievable over some range
with larger volumes of waste, through economies of scale. Other elements
of the vector Y, such as recyclables collection, garbage collection,
intermediate processing of recyclables, solid waste education, or marketing
of recyclables, may also be characterized by declining average costs over
some range of increases in volume.

Certainly, one would expect average

operational costs to be declining in a characteristic representing the size of
the region.
T(C IC0 ) represents transaction costs associated with organizing a unit
to determine what solid waste services should be provided, how they should
be provided, by whom, and when. Transaction costs are often nonmonetary and include the costs involved in carrying out administrative
transactions.
opportunity,

Transaction costs may include costs such as time,
travel or communication associated with organizing the

provision of any element of the vector Y. Transaction costs associated with
forming a solid waste region are expected to be increasing in the
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characteristic representing the number of entities comprising a cooperative
unit. Thus, one would expect a tradeoff of operational cost savings for
increased transaction costs as the number of entities involved in a
cooperative partnership increases.

In general, characteristics that reduce

average operational costs tend to increase transaction costs.

Another

example is a characteristic representing the level of solid waste services
initially provided by potential cooperating partners.

By joining another

county that has a more highly developed program, a county may be able to
reduce average operational costs by reducing costs associated with a
learning curve.

However, cooperation with such a county would likely be

accompanied by higher transaction costs since both would have to redefine
goals and priorities to reach a common strategy for progression from two
different initial points with respect to provision of services.
Note also that operational costs and transaction costs are both a
function of C, the vector of characteristics associated with potential
partners in a multi-county solid waste region, and C0 , the vector of
characteristics of the county under investigation.

While each element of C

is defined such that autonomy risk and political risk are increasing in Cj, the
>
impact of a change in Ci on E and T is indeterminate. That is, aaE = o and
C.1 <
aT >
-= o. For example, for a given county with a given characteristic
aci <
vector, C0 , an element of C representing a large population of a potential
arrangement may be negatively related to operational costs, characterized
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by economies of scale. While a large population may be negatively related
to operational costs, it may be either positively or negatively related to
transaction costs.

The degree to which population of an alternative

arrangement impacts either operational or transaction costs is dependent
upon the characteristic vector of the unit under evaluation.

For another

county with a different characteristic vector C0 , the same potential
arrangement with a large population may be positively related to operational
costs.

This may be the case if the county in question has a population large

enough itself to exhaust economies of scale cost savings.

When this

county considers cooperation with potential partners characterized by a
large population, they are not able to take advantage of operational cost
savings due to economies of scale. Thus both the direction and the
magnitude of the impact of a change in C; on operational costs or
transaction costs are indeterminate.
in a characteristic

Thus, the impact of a marginal change

on the price of Y is indeterminate:

dP y
aP y aE
aP y aT >
-= --+ --=
ctc..l
aE ac..l
aT ac..l <

o.

The hedonic price function for Y may

then be substituted into the expenditure function, such that

While the level of Y is a choice variable for the county, Y may be
constrained to be above a predetermined minimum level by mandate, or by
state or regional planners.

For example, a county may be required to

recycle a certain percentage of generated MSW, or they may be required to
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provide a minimum level of solid waste education, or they may be required
to reduce the volume of MSW disposed in a landfill.

Under such

circumstances, Y becomes further restrained to the following condition:
Y ~ R, where R is a vector of minimum service requirements for solid waste

services.

When provision of solid waste services is unrestricted,

R = 0.

The objective of the county, then is to maximize their utility, subject
to a budget constraint and a minimum service level constraint:
MAX

s.t.

U(X, Y, A(CI

Y

~

c 0 ),

Z(CI C 0 ))

R

which may be written as a LaGrangian function:
~ = U(X,

Y, A(CI C 0 ),

Z(CI

c 0 ))

+

A ( M - P x X - P y [ E ( CI C O) , T ( CI C O) ] Y) + µ ( R - Y)

Since a county may maximize utility by choosing not to consume at least
one good, a corner solution is feasible. Thus, the Kuhn-Tucker first order
conditions for maximizing the LaGrangian function are:

A.
B.
C.
D.

E.

a~ _
ax
aux=
ax
a~ =
aY

au _ }.Px
ax
o

~ 0

au -

E (C) T(C)

ay

au Y =
aY

a~

Ap

'

] - µ :S 0

0

au aA
aA ac.
.l

F.

y [

+

au az _ A [ aPy aE
az ac.
aE ac.
.l

.l

= 0
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+

aPy aT J
aT ac .
.l

:S

0

Equation E is the condition by which the decision making county chooses an
optimal level of each of n elements of C. Through careful definition of each
cj,

aA
az
> o and > o.
ac.
ac.
au aA < o and -au - az
- aA ac.
az ac.
-

.l

We also know that
< o , so that

.l

Joining a multi-county

.

au o and -au < o , thus
-a
<
az
A

au - aA
aA ac.

-

+

.l

au az <
az ac.

0

.l

solid waste region with a given set of characteristics

may lower utility by increasing the autonomy risk and increasing the political
risk. So why would a county choose to join a multi-county

solid waste

>

region? Recall that the sign of

aaE= o. In some
Ci

may cause this sign to be negative.
with particular characteristics,

cases, joining a region

<

That is, by joining a solid waste region

average operational costs may decrease,

causing a reduction in the price of Y. As noted earlier,~

au
aY

>

o.

aP

< o and
y

Thus, utility is actually increased when the characteristic

is

negatively related to operational costs, through the resulting impact on the
price of Y and the resulting level of Y. So a county will only choose to
cooperate at when the characteristics of a region arrangement potentially
reduce average operational costs.
characteristic

The utility gain from choosing a

level that decreases average operational costs, however, is

partially or fully offset by a concurrent utility reduction from an increase in
autonomy risk, political risk, and transaction costs resulting from choosing a
positive level of any characteristic

Ci. So from equation E, one should note

the tradeoff a county experiences in choosing a positive level of any
characteristic.

By this condition, a county will optimally choose a positive
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level of each characteristic only if the marginal gain from lowering average
operational costs outweighs the marginal loss from increasing transaction
costs, autonomy risk, and political risk.

3.

UTILITY DIFFERENCE MODEL
Solution to first order conditions A-F yields the demands for the

choice variables, X, Y, and C;, as a function of the exogenous variables, px,
C0 , M, and R:

Optimal levels of each choice variable may be denoted X *, Y *, C;*. A set
of n optimal characteristic elements comprises an optimal characteristic
vector C*.

By substituting these optimal demands into the original utility

function, one may obtain an indirect utility function,
v (X*, Y*, A ( c* I c 0 ),

z ( c* I c 0 )

) .

When optimal levels of each choice

variable are chosen, this indirect utility function yields the maximum
achievable utility.

The optimum level of C, however, assumes that a county

may choose any level of a characteristic.

For example, a county may

achieve maximum utility by choosing to cooperate with a county with a
population of 150,000, with substantial past experience in cooperation, with
a high per capita revenue, certainty in disposal assurance, and a well-
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developed recycling program.

But an arrangement with these characteristics

may not be a feasible consideration for the decision making county.

The

indicator "feasible" refers to a limitation of the choice set, as limited by
legislated requirements, decision maker preferences, or norms and values.
For example, if a county limits their feasible choice set to to cooperation
among counties with which it shares a border, neighboring counties, this
ideal partner(s) may not exist as a feasible alternative.
So the county begins the second stage of the decision process.

The

first stage was to maximize their utility function subject to a budget
constraint and a service level constraint to determine optimal levels of
choice variables, X, Y, and Ci. The characteristic

levels chosen as optimal

then become the characteristic "wish list" for the county.

The county would

receive maximum utility from choosing to cooperate with another county(s)
possessing these characteristics.

However, these optimal characteristic

levels may not be available, given the characteristics
feasibly serve as cooperation partners.

of counties that may

For example, a small rural county of

25,000 without a landfill may optimally choose to join an urban county of at
least 150,000 with a landfill.

But realistically, rural counties are often

grouped together geographically, and such an ideal may not exist.

So the

second task of the decision making county is to compare the utility
outcomes of feasibly available alternatives with the maximum utility level of
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the ideal partner(s) and choose the alternative that minimizes the difference
between the ideal outcome and available outcomes.
In the second stage, the decision making county evaluates the level
of indirect utility achievable under every feasible alternative regional
arrangement,

V(Xi,

0

yi, A(CilC

the number of feasible alternatives.

),

Z(CilC

0

)),

where i=1 ... n and n is

For example, if the decision making

county is surrounded by four neighboring counties (counties sharing a
border with the decision making county), and they limit their feasible choice
set to alliances with counties with which they share a border, then they
may consider 14 possible alternatives (one single-county
two-county

arrangement, four

alliances, four three-county alliances, four four-county

and one five-county

alliances,

alliance), so that n = 14. The county then subtracts the

achievable utility for each of n alternatives from the maximum achievable
utility:
V(X*,

Y*,A(C*IC

0

),

Z(C*IC

0

))

-

V(Xi,

yi,A(CilC

0

),

Z(CilC

0

))

Assuming a linear functional form, the objective of the county then becomes
to choose the alternative from n available alternatives that minimizes the
utility difference:
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4.

COOPERATION NEGOTIATION
Once a county chooses an alternative that is feasible and minimizes

the difference between optimal utility and achievable utility, they may
pursue this alternative, but they cannot unilaterally choose this alternative.
All counties are undergoing this same process simultaneously.

Each county

individually chooses an optimal level of choice variables and then compares
the utility outcome of feasible alternatives with the utility maximizing
outcome.

So each county emerges from the process with a ranking of

region formation alternatives according to their difference from maximum
utility.
As a simple example, suppose there are only two counties, A and 8,
and each county only has two alternatives: to form a single-county
to join the other in forming a two-county

region.

region or

Suppose the utility

difference from the optimal level for each alternative is shown below.

County A
County B

Single
5
25

Multi
15
10

County A's utility would be maximized by forming a single-county
County B's utility would be maximized by forming a two-county

region.
region with

A. But if A forms a single-county region, then 8 has no choice but to also
form a single-county

region, and B's utility would be 15 units lower.

However, if county A can be coerced into forming a two-county
their utility would be reduced by only 10 units.
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region,

A move from two single-

county regions to one two-county
only costing A 10 units.

region would benefit B by 15 units, while

If county B could use this potential gain to offset

A's loss, then both may be able to minimize their utility difference by
forming a two-county

region.

For example, if B is able to achieve a utility

difference gain for A of at least 10 units by agreeing to an arrangement that
reduces A's transaction costs or risk at a cost to B of no more than 15
units, then the negotiation results in a Pareto improvement for both parties.
This may be illustrated in Figure 1, where the utility outcome after B
negotiates a reduction in transaction costs or risk for A is a utility difference
for A of 5 units and a utility difference for B of 20 units.
be able to gain 5 units of utility, over the single-county

Thus, B might yet

option A would have

forced them into, through negotiating an agreement that reduces the
expected losses for A associated with cooperation.
This type of matching and negotiation is assumed to take place
among all potential partners until all potential Pareto improvements are
exhausted and an optimal feasible arrangement emerges.
characteristics

The

of counties in the feasible choice set influence a county's

decision in two ways. First, they directly influence the autonomy and
political risk a county would face and the price a county would pay for solid
waste services under a cooperative arrangement.
influence a county's utility.
process simultaneously,

Thus, they indirectly

But all counties undergo the same decision

and cooperation requires willingness on the part of
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OPTIMAL UTILITY
B's Utility Difference
25

20

15

10

A's Utility Difference
5

5

10

15

20

25
Utility outcome of
forming
two single-county
regions

BA

'--------------+---A

AB

}-----+----+---.....-------i--

Figure 1. Bargaining Strategies in Negotiating Cooperation Outcomes

Utility outcome of
forming
a two-county region

Utility outcome after B
negotiates a reduction in
transaction costs for A at
B's expense

all participants.

So the characteristics of other counties also impact the final

outcome through their influence on other counties' utility maximizing
preferences and the implications of these preferences on their willingness to
cooperate and their leverage in negotiating a cooperative arrangement.
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CHAPTER IV

CASE STUDIES

1. INTRODUCTION
Tennessee passed a comprehensive Solid Waste Management Act in
1991 (T.C.A. §68-211-801

et seq ). Passage of this Act was the first effort

by the state to require all counties to meet a minimum standard level of
service in the area of solid waste management.

Elements of the legislation

addressed solid waste planning, collection, disposal, recycling, education,
and funding as well as collection and disposal of problem wastes.
Specifically, the legislation required each county to form a solid waste
region and to develop a comprehensive ten-year solid waste plan for the
region.

One required element of the plan was reduction in the per capita

amount of waste entering landfills or incinerators by 25% by December 31,
1995, using 1989 as the benchmark.

The legislation also required that at

least 90% of all residents have collection service available to them.

The

minimum collection service level was established to be a system of drop-off
convenience centers for garbage collection.

Additionally,

each count't.__
h~d

to establish a minimum of Or::!_e
collection center for recyclable materials.
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Whole tires were banned from class I landfills, with provisions for tire
shredding services included as part of the legislation.

A disposal surcharge

on each ton of waste disposed and a retail surcharge on new tire purchases
were also included.

Other elements of the legislation included requirements

for MSW education, and detailed progress reporting.

Grant programs were

established for planning, convenience center establishment,

household

hazardous waste collection, tire storage, and landfill scales purchase.
Recycling rebates were established for the eleven largest counties.
As a first step in comprehensive MSW planning, solid waste advisors
in each of nine development districts were initially charged with identifying
"rational waste disposal areas", based on geography, existence of a viable
disposal facility that would likely remain in operation, any existing
cooperation, and volume of waste disposed.

The legislation required that

these findings be presented to counties within the district in the form of a
"District Needs Assessment" by September 30, 1992.

Each county was

then required to form a solid waste region by December 12, 1992.
According to Section 12.a.2. of the Act, "The preferred organization of the
regions shall be multi-county.

Any county adopting a resolution establishing

a single county region shall state the reasons for acting alone in the
resolution."

In addition to statutory language, monetary incentives were

added to the planning grant structure to encourage formation of multi
county regions.

If a county chose to form a single-county
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region, they

received a planning grant of $15,000.

If a county joined one other county,

both counties received a planning grant of $17,500,

and if a county formed

a region with at least two· other counties, all counties received a planning
grant of $20,000.

State-employed technical staff also encouraged

formation of multi-county

regions.

The objective of each municipal solid waste region was to develop a
ten-year comprehensive solid waste management plan. After the Needs
Assessments were completed, each county had approximately ten weeks to
decide whether they would form a single-county solid waste region, or
whether they would join neighboring counties to form a multi-county

region.

There were no upper limits placed on region size, provided that all region
members were contiguous counties.

The decision each Tennessee county

made regarding formation of a solid waste region and the resulting action
toward solid waste management provides a natural experiment in which
multi-county

cooperation in solid waste management may be examined

qualitatively through case studies.
This chapter presents five selected case studies of solid waste region
formation in Tennessee.
one is a three-county
three-county

Two of the five cases are single-county

region, one is a ten-county

regions,

region, and one was a

region that has split into a two-county

region and a single

county region. The cases vary widely in composition and characteristics,
past experience in solid waste, and outcomes.
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In addition to providing

insight into the process whereby the counties decided to form the particular
region, the cases also allow study of the results of the decisions the
counties made. The cases examine actual MSW management services and
activities and how they were impacted by the region established.
A Case St11dy Selection
Cases were selected in an effort to ensure diversity of the cases and
to further the understanding of the regionalization process and its outcomes.
Elements of the decision process and resulting outcomes the study attempts
to capture include single and multi-county
county regions, multi-county

regions, small and large multi

regions with prior grassroots cooperative

experience, dis-banded multi-county

regions, rural and metropolitan regions,

regions with loose ties, and regions with formal legal arrangements.

To aid

in case selection, an initial interview was conducted with each of nine
development district solid waste consultants in the state.

Development

district staff were able to provide information about how each region was
formed and a summary of each region's solid waste activities since region
formation.

Based on this information, it was possible to select cases with

elements required for development of a complete picture of solid waste
cooperation and its outcomes.
B Case Study Method
The case studies focus on region formation decisions made in 1992.
These decisions were political in nature, and often elected officials were
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involved in key decision making roles. Considering the frequent change of
political tides, decisions made five years ago often involved a set of players
quite different from those currently occupying similar roles. The institutional
arrangements of individual counties also contributed significantly
decision making process.

to the

Depending on the particular set of institutional

arrangements in place in an individual county, sources of information and
decision making channels varied greatly.

These factors make it difficult to

standardize a method for conducting the case studies.
The first contact in each case was the solid waste consultant for that
county's development district.

In only one case had the current

development district solid waste consultant been in this role since the time
the decision was made in 1992.

But in each case, the development district

consultant could provide a brief summary of the current MSW management
program in place in each region.
for identification

Included in this interview was a request

of individuals who were involved in the decision making

process, or who might be able to provide insight into the case. A second
target interview was sought with the county executive who was in office in
the county during the 1990-1994 term.

When this was not possible (and

sometimes in addition), an interview was sought with the current county
executive, serving a term from 1994-1998.

As part of this interview,

county executives were asked to identify individuals that played key roles in
the decision making process and in the management of MSW.
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Each

subsequent contact was also asked to identify individuals that may be able
to provide insight into development of the case, resulting in further
contacts.

The process was repeated until a clear picture of the case under

investigation began to emerge.
For each of the five cases, a brief description of the county (counties)
involved and the management of their MSW prior to passage of the 1991
Solid Waste Management Act is given. This is followed by a description of
the process that led them to form a single- or multi-county
region and factors that were influential in this decision.

solid waste

The next section

then describes what happened in the county (counties) once they had
formed a solid waste region, including development of their ten-year plan
and implementation of this plan to date. Finally, lessons learned and points
of interest from the case are discussed.

This section attempts to link the

case study decision process and the outcomes to the theoretical model
previously developed.

2. COCKE COUNTY SOLID WASTE REGION
A History and Background Information
Cocke County, Tennessee, is located in the eastern part of Tennessee
and is home to 29,141 residents.

Figure 2 shows the county location, and

Figure 3 displays selected characteristics of the county and neighboring
counties.

The county borders North Carolina, separated by the Appalachian
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Figure 2. Cocke County Solid Waste Region
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Figure 3. Characteristics of Cocke County and Surrounding Counties.

Mountains.

Approximately

half of the county is mountainous terrain, and

the northeast corner of the Great Smoky Mountains National Park extends
into the southwest corner of Cocke County.

The city of Newport,

population 7, 1 23, is the county seat.
Prior to passage of the 1991 Solid Waste Management Act, Cocke
County provided a system of green boxes for drop-off collection of garbage.
The city of Newport provided curbside collection for its residents.
known recycling opportunities were available in the county.

No

The county

owned a Class I landfill, and processed 100-120 tons per day at the landfill.
At the time that the county was required to form a solid waste region,
Cocke County had 1.8 years remaining life at their landfill.

The landfill did

not meet recent federal Subtitle D landfill requirements, and was scheduled
to close in March, 1994, as required by Subtitle D. Prior to passage of the
Act, solid waste management, including operation of the landfill, was
handled by the Landfill Committee, which was a standing committee of the
county commission, comprised of seven members, or half of the entire
commission.
B Decision Process
Early in 1992, the Tennessee Department of Environment and
Conservation (TDEC) sent a letter to each county executive in the state that
detailed the requirements of the Solid Waste Management Act.

Then the

development district contacted the county executive upon completion of the
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District Solid Waste Needs Assessment (approximately September, 1992) to
inform them of the findings of the needs assessments and to advise them in
forming solid waste regions to develop 10-year plans, as required by the
Act.
Cocke County elected to form a single-county
consideration of multi-county

region options.

region, without serious

The Landfill Committee of the

county commission that was previously in existence remained, and five of
its seven members were appointed to the new Cocke County Solid Waste
Board, composed of 2 members representing the city of Newport and 3
members representing the county.

All appointments were made by the

county executive, and all were members of the county commission.
the recommendation

Upon

of the county executive, the board recommended to

the county commission that the county form a single-county

solid waste

region, and a resolution to this effect was adopted by the entire
commission.

The function of the board was primarily to meet requirements

of the Act, and they generally acted as a rubber stamp for the county
executive's

recommendations.

There were three influences that resulted in this decision: ( 1) there
was a very strong desire to have a landfill in the county, (2) there was
strong opposition to importing any waste into the county, and (3) the
county felt that the position of neighboring counties with respect to solid
waste management left them no choice but to plan independently.
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County

leaders felt that a landfill in the county was imperative for recruiting
industries to the county and for economic development.
forming a multi-county
out-of-county

waste.

They also felt that

solid waste region was the equivalent of importing
While they were considering alternative courses of

action once the existing landfill closed, Cocke County was approached by a
private waste management firm about locating a private landfill in the
county.

But the site that was initially proposed was unacceptable to county

leaders, and when they learned that the private firm intended to import out
of-county waste, they ceased communication.
Four counties border Cocke County, but no formal contact was made
with any of them regarding multi-county
characteristics

cooperation.

Selected

of these counties may be found in Figure 3. Prior to passage

of the Act, Sevier County had secured a long-term contract with a private
firm for mixed waste composting of all MSW. MSW is delivered to their
processing center where some recyclable materials are manually sorted.
Remaining waste is mixed with sludge in large digesters.

The product is

then placed in windrows resulting in a usable compost product.

Cocke

County felt that Sevier County had the management of their MSW under
control and would not be interested in cooperation.

A large private Subtitle

D landfill designed to handle 400 tons per day for 40 years had recently
been constructed

in Jefferson County.

Similarly, Hamblen County had

recently constructed a public Subtitle D landfill, permitted for 15 years.
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Greene County was in a situation similar to Cocke County, where their
landfill was scheduled to close when Subtitle D regulations became
effective.

However, Greene County had already made arrangements with a

large private landfill in neighboring Hawkins County to service a transfer
station in Greene County and export to Hawkins County upon closure of
their landfill.

It appeared that all of their neighbors either had a landfill or

had made long-term arrangements for disposal.

So in the opinion of Cocke

County decision makers, the only way they could have a landfill in their
county, which they strongly desired, was to form a single-county
waste region.

solid

All of the decision makers interviewed reported that they

didn't really see that Cocke County had any choice but to be a single-county
region.
County officials reported that the monetary incentive built into the
planning grants in an effort to encourage formation of multi-county

solid

waste regions had no bearing on their decision to form a single-county
region, claiming that the amount of the incentive ($2,500 to $5,000) was
too small to make any difference at all. The East Tennessee Development
District (ETDD) had agreed to do a limited number of ten-year solid waste
plans. Cocke County made an early request for the ETDD to develop their
plan for a price equal to that of the base state planning grant, $15,000,
they agreed.
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and

C Organization and Activities
Since the primary goal all along had been to construct a new landfill
in the county once the existing landfill closed, the county contracted an
engineering consulting firm to evaluate the chosen landfill site and to
estimate the cost of construction

and maintenance.

I

The consultants

estimated that a Class I Subtitle D landfill would cost Cocke County an
average of $40 per ton over 20 years. This estimate included costs of
development, operation, closure, and monitoring.

It did, however, assume

that the county could obtain a permit for the selected site, which was the
property adjacent to the current landfill nearing closure.

The state failed to

grant a permit for the proposed site due to problems with groundwater
monitoring.

The county still plans to construct a new landfill, but an

acceptable site has not yet been found.
In the meantime, the deadline for compliance with Subtitle D was
extended to October, 1996.

Additionally,

Cocke County's landfill (along

with several other landfills in the state) was granted a variance that allows
vertical expansion in the landfill's current waste footprint and extends the
life of the landfill through January, 1997.

But Cocke County's landfill

reached maximum capacity and was forced to close permanently in June,
1996.

Cocke County negotiated a contract with a private waste

management firm to handle disposal after closure of the landfill.

Cocke

County now hauls collected waste to the county's transfer station located
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at the closed landfill site, where they pay a set fee per ton for the private
firm to haul waste to the disposal site. Transportation
all paid through the private firm.

fees and tip fees are

MSW is hauled to Hamblen County and

disposed in the landfill owned and operated jointly by the city of Morristown
and Hamblen County.

While Cocke County is indirectly cooperating with

neighboring Hamblen County, no formal contact has been made between
local governments.

Cocke County's contract is with a private firm, which in

turn has a contract with the Morristown/Hamblen

County Landfill.

Cocke

County has been permitted to construct a Class Ill/IV landfill (for
construction

and demolition waste and yard waste) at the site of the current

landfill, and it was scheduled to open in October, 1996.
The former green box collection system has been converted to ten full
service convenience centers.

Eventually, recycling will be available at all

convenience centers, but it is currently in place in less than half of the sites.
The city of Newport provides curbside garbage pick-up for its residents and
commercial businesses and provides opportunities for drop-off recycling.
Newport owns a material recovery facility (MRF) for intermediate processing
of recyclables and all recyclables collected by the county are donated to the
city facility.
The responsible unit recognized by the state for management of MSW
is the solid waste region, which may be a minimum size of a single county.
Traditionally,

most cities have handled MSW management independently of
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counties, and such has been the case in Cocke County.

But when the

county formed a solid waste region, the responsible unit for all MSW
management in the county, including residents of the cities, became the
county.

So while the county did not cooperate in the management of MSW

with neighboring counties, some degree of cooperation was required within
the county.

The city of Newport and Cocke County worked very well

together to expand solid waste management services as long as the county
owned landfill was still operational.

But when the county began exporting

waste to Hamblen County via a private firm, problems began to surface.
The city had been providing collection and paying tip fees at the county
landfill.

When the landfill closed, they were then required to pay disposal

fees charged by the private firm, which were higher than the landfill tip fees
previously charged.

In response, the city c~

commercial businesses.

:;;;--

service to many

As expected, the reduction in service has caused a

great deal of conflict, and as yet, the situation has not been resolved.
Interestingly,

the fees charged by the private firm were higher than the

previous fees, but less than the estimated fee required if the county were
able to construct and operate a new Subtitle D landfill at the site of the old
landfill.
Oversight of the region decision, plan development, and plan
implementation

has been primarily the responsibility of the county executive.

While the solid waste board is still functioning,
59

it does not play an active

role in decision making or in implementation.

Other aspects of the solid

waste management plan include a recent application for a state education
grant.

Education is currently limited to that provided by a local Keep

America Beautiful chapter.

Yard waste and brush were banned from the

landfill, and are not accepted according to the recent private disposal
contract, to help meet the 25%
reduction goal. Tires are collected at the
--::::,
landfill and shredded by a state-contracted

shredder, then landfilled.

D Lessa □ s Learned
There are several interesting elements associated with the Cocke
County Solid Waste Region that should be emphasized.

First is that

potential cost savings in landfill disposal through regional cooperation was
not a pivotal decision factor in the Cocke County case. Shortly after the
needs assessment was presented to the county, development district and
County Technical Assistance Service (CTAS) staff presented the county
executive with cost estimates of operating a new Subtitle D landfill
independently.

These projected cost increases were not judged to outweigh

potential losses in economic development and autonomy associated with not
having an independent landfill.

In fact, it appears that the county gains

significant utility just from having a landfill in their county and having
autonomy over the waste disposed there. The desire to have a landfill was
so great that the cost of the landfill was a secondary consideration.

In fact,

the cost associated with disposal was not an issue until it caused conflict.
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County officials wanted to develop a new Subtitle D landfill, regardless of
the cost, but when actual disposal costs increased by a small amount when
the county entered a private disposal contract, cost became a significant
issue. It appears that in the Cocke County case, potential operational cost
savings due to economies of scale, which were made known to decision
makers, were outweighed by potential losses in autonomy associated with
multi-county

cooperation in solid waste planning.

The Cocke County case also effectively

illustrates the point that

cooperation is a process. The county chose to form a single-county

region

to develop their ten-year solid waste management plan, with no intentions
of cooperating with any other entity, either public or private, to manage
MSW.

But future events (i.e., failure to permit a Class I Subtitle D landfill)

necessitated some cooperation to secure a future disposal alternative.

Also

illustrated is the role a private firm may play as an independent broker, or a
third party negotiator in cooperative arrangements.

Cocke County decision

makers did not initially choose to investigate potential cooperation with
Hamblen County because they felt the goals and current situations of each
county rendered them incompatible as cooperative partners.
was determined to operate an independent landfill.

Cocke County

Hamblen County already

had a landfill capable of handling their waste in the long run. Thus Cocke
County decision makers could see no benefit to be gained through
cooperation with Hamblen County.

So when Cocke County was forced to
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find a short term solution apart from their long term interest in an
independent in-county disposal facility, why did they not negotiate directly
with Hamblen County?

One possible explanation may be that a private firm

acting as a broker between counties may have been able to reduce
transaction costs and political risk associated with negotiating an
agreement.

The objective of the firm is assumed to be profit maximization,

while the county seeks to minimize political risk and maintain autonomy, in
addition to minimizing costs.

A third party without a stake in the local

politics associated with conflict resolution may be able to negotiate an
agreement at lower transaction costs.
Cocke County had to make considerable changes to their MSW
management system to comply with requirements of the Act.
waste constraint imposed by the Act was significantly

The solid

binding in the Cocke

County case. While this constraint involved an array of solid waste
services, the only issue mentioned in the decision process was disposal.
The Act addressed recycling, waste reduction, education, and a wide
variety of solid waste issues, but the only aspect initially considered in
Cocke County was disposal.

Disposal is likely the most politically volatile of

..::s~i
g~h.:..:t:.:e:.:d_w:,.:.:..:h:;::e.:..:n...:.h.:.:a:.:.n.:.::d=le....,,__,.....,e=l-=-ec:::.t~e:.::d:..o:.f:..:.f.:.;ic;.;,;ia
Rather than address MSW
management as a whole, political considerations may have forced disposal
to precede consideration of other aspects of solid waste management.
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It

appears that disposal was the only concern until it was reasonably assured,
and then other aspects of MSW management received attention.
Control of solid waste management in the Cocke County case rested
almost entirely with the county executive.

Institutions

in place in Cocke

County allowed the county executive nearly full control of the region
formation decision and subsequent compliance with the Act.

In the case of

Cocke County, the county executive is a politically powerful local figure and
has assumed nearly full responsibility for the management of solid waste.
this case, the institutional arrangements in place have reduced the number
and scope of decision makers significantly,
likelihood of multi-county

even further reducing the

cooperation.

While the additional funds available to counties cooperating in solid
waste management were intended to encourage cooperation, this incentive
was essentially negated in the Cocke County case. ETDD staff offered to
handle the planning requirement for the price of the base state planning
grant.

This had almost the same effect as excluding the requirement of

development of a ten-year plan, undermining the monetary planning grant
incentive.
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3. SCOTT COUNTY SOLID WASTE REGION
A History and Backgra1 md Information
Scott County is a rural county located in the northeastern part of the
state, bordering Kentucky.

Figure 4 shows the county location, and Figure

5 identifies several selected characteristics of Scott and surrounding
counties.

There are three incorporated cities in Scott County: Winfield,

Oneida, and Huntsville, the county seat. Scott County's population is
18,358 and they typically dispose of 30 tons of MSW per day. Scott
County is a mountainous region, as is much of eastern Tennessee, and the
northwestern

corner of the county is designated as part of the Big South

Fork National River and Recreation Area. The county is located in the
Appalachian coal region, and coal mining was the county's

largest

employment sector until recently.
Before developing their ten-year solid waste management plan, Scott
County collected MSW for disposal through a green box drop-off system.
The city of Oneida operated a collection service for residents, and Winfield
and Huntsville each contracted with a private hauler to provide collection
services for residents.

No recycling or education efforts were in existence.

The county owned a landfill and all of the county's waste was disposed at
this landfill.

The developed landfill had space for 15 years of disposal, but

was not compliant with Subtitle D, and was expected to close in March,
1994 (later extended to October, 1996) as required by Subtitle D. The
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Figure 4. Scott County Solid Waste Region
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Figure 5. Characteristics of Scott County and Surrounding Counties.

landfill was purchased in 1990 from a private individual.

While Subtitle D

regulations were in place at the time of the landfill purchase, few decision
makers viewed Subtitle D as binding and many were convinced that the
landfill would remain operational for 15 years, with an option to expand
significantly.
B Decision Process
Upon completion of the needs assessment, the Development District
staff made a presentation to the county commission.

In this presentation,

the development district solid waste consultant recommended that Scott
County form a multi-county

solid waste region with Campbell and Morgan

Counties, primarily because the three counties together would likely be able
to manage solid waste cheaper than each county individually.

Campbell,

Scott, and Morgan County Executives exchanged correspondence and met
at least once to discuss the possibility of forming a multi-county

region.

The Scott County Executive also met with the Fentress County Executive to
discuss the possibility of cooperation.

But with the deadline for region

formation quickly approaching, each decided to form a single-county

region.

Scott, Campbell, and Morgan Counties, however, added a clause to their
resolutions that left a window open for future cooperation in forming a
multi-county

solid waste region if they deemed it necessary.

According to the county executives, each county realized that they
could probably handle the problem better together, but it was easier to sell a
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single-county

region to the county commission, which had to approve

resolutions creating solid waste regions. The implications of Subtitle D and
the Solid Waste Management Act were not yet fully understood, and county
executives felt that there was not sufficient time to wage the political battle
necessary to form a multi-county
about the benefits of cooperation.

region, or to educate local decision makers
The findings of the needs assessments

were presented in late September, 1992.

Local elections were then held in

November, 1992, so no action was taken prior to the elections in
anticipation of potential political changes.

Once the elections were over,

the newly-elected county commissioners had only a month to decide the
composition of the solid waste region, in addition to familiarizing themselves
with other issues of local importance.
Several other factors contributed toward Scott County's decision to
form a single-county

region.

handling of future disposal.

Of primary importance was the anticipated
Local publicity assured citizens that the landfill

recently purchased would serve their disposal needs for the next 15 years.
Although this information was inaccurate, it was then hard to convince
county commissioners, and even harder to convince residents that this
landfill was not acceptable and proper disposal would be very expensive.
Since local residents and many county legislators were convinced that
relatively cheap disposal was assured for 15 years, they saw few benefits
to cooperation with other counties that also appeared to have disposal
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assurance.

Likewise, they also saw few benefits for cooperation with other

counties that did not have disposal assurance, since they were strongly
opposed to importation of waste.

They assumed that cooperation with a

county that did not have disposal assurance would mean that they became
responsible for also assuring disposal capacity for region partners.

Local

decision makers felt like their solid waste management situation was under
control, and they wanted to protect their citizens from outside waste, and
from higher taxes or charges.
Another factor contributing

toward the decision was the MSW

management situation in each of the surrounding counties.

Fentress County

to the west was trying to develop their own Subtitle D landfill and was
looking for counties to contribute waste.

Since Scott County was

anticipating disposal assurance for 15 years, they did not consider this a
viable option.

Morgan County to the southwest is the site of a regional

prison, which provides labor for the county's landfill.

They, too, anticipated

that disposal was assured for the ten-year planning period.

Anderson

County is a metropolitan county with a population more than three and a
half times that of Scott County.

Anderson County to the southeast is the

site of a large private Subtitle D landfill that processes approximately

1 ,40.Q

tons per day from Anderson and Knox Counties, so cooperation was not
even considered in this case. Campbell County to the east did not have a
landfill, and since Scott County anticipated long-term disposal capacity, they
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feared becoming a dumping ground in the case of an alliance with Campbell
County.

The multi-county

option most seriously considered was an alliance

among Scott, Campbell and Morgan Counties.

The county executives

decided, however, that, "[The goals] of the three counties are so far apart
that we are not compatible as a team (Scott County Executive, 1996)."
Both Scott County and Cocke County (the case previously presented)
are in the ETDD. Similar to the situation of Cocke County, Scott County
requested that the ETDD solid waste consultant develop their ten-year
comprehensive solid waste management plan. The ETDD agreed to write
the plan for the price of the base planning grant the Act awarded.

Thus,

the planning grant "bonus" for forming a multi-county

region, had no impact

on the decision of the county to form a single-county

region.

C Organization and Activities
Scott County chose to form a single-county solid waste region
primarily because (1) they wanted to have a landfill, (2) they did not want to
import out-of-county

waste, (3) they assumed they had disposal assurance

for 15 years, and (4) they felt they didn't have time to sufficiently
multi-county

cooperation alternatives and their implications.

explore

As one might

expect, dependence upon disposal assurance from a landfill not compliant
with Subtitle D led to much strife when the county began developing their
ten-year plan. The landfill was operating at a significant loss. The financial
strain became so great that the county was forced to negotiate a contract
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with a small local firm to operate the landfill.

The arrangement was by

monthly contract and gave Scott County "free" disposal at the landfill.

But,

the only way the private firm would accept the contract was if they were
allowed to import out-of-county

waste.

Waste from Campbell County,

Fentress County, and two counties in Kentucky is currently disposed in the
landfill owned by Scott County and privately operated.

Scott County

residents were initially disturbed by the importation of waste, but public
education regarding the alternative, higher taxes or fees, quieted the
controversy.
So the financial situation of the landfill caused Scott County to trade
autonomy over their landfill for free disposal and host fees they negotiated
with the private firm for all waste imported into Scott County.

The private

firm currently operating the landfill has applied for a permit to develop a new
Subtitle D Class I landfill in the county, but the permit is still pending.

In the

meantime, Scott County has applied for a variance for extending the life of
the current landfill.

However, the length of the extension and the status of

the permit are unknown at this time. When the landfill closes, Scott County
will be responsible for charges associated with closure, expected to be
approximately

$1 . 5 million.

Additionally,

Scott County will no longer

receive free disposal and will be subject to tipping fees for disposal, and will
lose the host fees they currently receive for waste imported from out-of-
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county.

To date, no disposal arrangements have been made beyond closure

of the Scott County landfill.
As the disposal picture has unfolded in Scott County, they have
become much more open to multi-county cooperation and the benefits it
may provide.

The Scott County Executive met with the County Executives

from Campbell and Morgan Counties in August, 1996, and the three have
scheduled another meeting for October, 1996.

While no multi-county

arrangements have yet emerged, they are considering potential benefits of
cooperation.
Early in the planning process, there was a significant amount of
conflict between the county and its municipalities.

The town of Huntsville

had a contract with a private firm for provision of house-to-house garbage
pick-up in the city.

When the Act was passed and counties were named the

responsible unit for MSW management, Huntsville discontinued the service.
The city viewed the Act as an opportunity

for them to get out of the solid

waste business and relinquish the responsibility to the county.

The town of

Oneida provided public collection services and have continued to do so after
passage of the Act.

One seat on the region board was reserved for a

representative from Oneida, but the town has refused to fill the position and
that seat remains vacant.

The town of Winfield had a contract with a

private firm for provision of household garbage pick-up prior to passage of
the Act, and they have maintained this service.
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The town has one

representative on the region board and has cooperated with the county in
developing the region's ten-year plan.
The Act requires that 90% of the residents of a county have
collection service available to them.

Scott County is meeting this

requirement based on the presence of a number of small local private
haulers. While collection service is technically "available" to any household
willing to pay for it, disposal figures suggest that less than half of the
generated waste is currently entering the stream of managed MSW.

Scott

County has received several grants for recycling equipment and plans to
establish drop-off recycling centers.

But to date, recycling opportunities

are

not yet in place, and Scott County has received an extension from the state
to meet recycling requirements.

No organized solid waste education efforts

are yet in place, although the ten-year plan includes an education
component.

Whole tires, which are banned from Class I landfills by the Act,

are shredded at the landfill by a state-contracted
shredded tires are then landfilled.

private shredder, and the

There are no plans to deal with yard

waste separately from MSW collected for disposal.

In their five-year plan

update required by the state to be submitted in April, 1996, Scott County
reported that they have exceeded the 25% reduction goal set by the Act,
however, the source of the reduction is unclear.
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D I essaos Learned
The theoretical model developed assumes that decision makers have a
complete information set on which they base sound economic decisions, but
the Scott County case provides evidence that this assumption may not be
valid in all case. In the case of Scott County, it is clear that the region
formation decision was made under the auspices of misinformation
lack of education on the part of some decision makers.

and a

Although federal

Subtitle D regulations were in place when the Act was passed (and even
before the current landfill was purchased), there was a great deal of denial
about the extent to which the regulations would be binding.

Decision

makers decided to form a single-county region under the assumption that
they had long-term assurance of disposal capacity.
appeared open to the concept of multi-county

Since decision makers

cooperation, as evidenced by

passage of a resolution that allowed formation of a multi-county

region in

the future if they deemed it beneficial, it seems possible that a more fully

--

informed decision process may have resulted in a different outcome.
Scott County is a prime example of economics driving cooperation.

Scott County elected to form a single-county solid waste region, and fully
intended to handle solid waste management independently.

But when their

landfill began to (and continued to) operate in the red, they chose to accept
costs associated with defacto cooperation that they had not previously been
willing to accept.

They chose to accept a loss of autonomy over their
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landfill, and importation of out-of-county

waste.

In the Scott County case,

however, it appears that this loss of autonomy was actually accompanied
by a reduction in political risk. Prior to turning the landfill over to a private
,--

----------

operator, the county landfill was operating at such a financial loss that very
significant fee or tax increases would have been required to continue
operation.

Given a limited budget, and a wide variety of goods and services

that it was required to produce, Scott County's budget constraint was
binding for independent provision of solid waste management disposal
services.

Decision makers calculated that the potential political risk

associated with large fee or tax increases outweighed potential political risk
associated with the loss of autonomy.

By introducing a third party private

interest, the county was able to further reduce political risk associated with
fee or tax increases by obtaining free disposal, which further offset losses
due to the reduction of autonomy.
It does appear, however, that Scott County may have traded
reductions in short run political risk for increases in long run political risk.
While the disposal problem has been solved for the short run, with minimum
political risk and reduced autonomy, it is likely that the level of political risk

--

will reach an all-time high in the near future.

When the current landfill

extensions run out, the county will face landfill closure costs in excess of
$1.5 million.

Additionally,

they will cease to receive host fees, and will go

from free disposal to no disposal, which is a problem that will likely be
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costly, both in terms of economic costs and political risk, to solve.

In

anticipation of this crisis, Scott County is now seriously considering
cooperation with neighboring Campbell and Morgan Counties.

Initially,

Scott County felt that the transaction costs associated with cooperating
with neighboring counties, each with their own ideas and plans for solid
waste management, would be high, as confirmed by the previous quote of
the Scott County Executive.

As evidence of the change in attitudes with

respect to cooperation , one local decision maker currently involved in the
management of solid waste recently offered this assessment: "We have
become aware that Campbell, Scott, and Morgan Counties are really a lot
more alike than we thought, and we really need to be working together.
We understand this now, but we just didn't see it back then."
One aspect of the decision process not previously discussed is that of
timing, which appeared to significantly

influence Scott County's decision.

Education is a critical element in the process of cooperation,
requires both time and effort.

but education

Decision makers must first realize potential

benefits of cooperation before they may be weighed against often obvious
barriers to cooperation.
opportunity

The time framed allowed for the decision gave little

for education.

The results of the needs assessment were

presented in October, 1992, but no action was taken immediately due to
anticipation of political changes pending the November elections.

So once

the political tides had settled, Scott County decision makers were left with
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approximately one month to become educated about solid waste region
requirements and region options, and to make a decision.

In retrospect, it

appears that education about the realities of current solid waste
management has taken about five years, and is a continuous process.

4. INTER-LOCAL SOLID WASTE AUTHORITY
A History and Backgrmmd Information
The Inter-local Solid Waste Authority includes Giles County and
Lincoln County, the city of Tullahoma, which is located in both Coffee and
Franklin Counties, and Franklin County, except the city of Winchester.
Recently, the city of Shelbyville, located in Bedford County, has also joined
the Inter-local Solid Waste Authority.

The counties and cities of the Inter

local region are located in the southcentral part of the state, with Franklin,
Giles, and Lincoln Counties bordering Alabama.

The region is predominately

rural, with a large agricultural base. The region has traditionally
large contributor to the state's livestock and crop production,
the region has also become a large nursery supplier.

been a

but recently

The location of the

Inter-local Solid Waste Authority may be found in Figure 6, and selected
characteristics

of member counties and surrounding counties may be found

in Figure 7.
When the Act was passed, Coffee County and Moore County had no
landfill.

Franklin and Lincoln Counties had landfills with little capacity, and
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Figure 6. Inter-local Solid Waste Authority
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decision makers had no inclination to finance bringing their existing capacity
up to Federal Subtitle D standards by 1994.

Giles, Lawrence, and Maury

Counties had a landfill with at least some capacity and some potential to
expand.

Decision makers in these counties were inclined to make the

financial commitment to meet Subtitle D standards by 1994.

Large regional

private landfills that had already publicly committed to conforming with
Subtitle D standards were located in Marshall County and Bedford County.
Both of these held a permit to obtain waste from an unlimited area.
In general, each of the 17 cities in the region handled collection in the
city independently.

Franklin County had a system of 1 2 attended

convenience centers, and some green boxes, in addition to city service in
Huntland, Decherd, Cowan, Estill Springs and Sewanee.

Collection was

available to 100% of county residents prior to passage of the Solid Waste
Management Act.

Residents of cities in Giles County (Pulaski, Minor Hill,

Elkton, Lynnville, and Ardemore) paid a monthly solid waste fee for
collection by the city of Pulaski and disposal in the Pulaski landfill.

No

collection service was available to the 41 % of county residents living
outside the cities.

The cities in Lincoln County also contracted private

collection services, and green boxes served the remaining 70% of county
residents.

A limited amount of recycling was available in the region,

primarily through drop-off sites established and operated by individual cities.
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B Decision Process
Elected officials from Lincoln County, Fayetteville, Coffee County,
Tullahoma, and Franklin County have long been interested in seeking a
regional solution to their solid waste problems.

For some, this interest dates

back to the TERRA Incineration project of the Oak River Regional Resource
Authority,

proposed in the early 1980's.

incinerator in Tullahoma.

The proposal was to site an

The authority received over $2 million in interest

free loans and over $1 million in grants from the state and the Department
of Defense.

But the project moved very slowly and eventually bogged down

and fizzled out.

Although the faces of many of the decision makers

involved in the incinerator project had changed by the time the Solid Waste
Management Act was passed, failure of the former project seemed to
motivate many decision makers to push very hard for cooperation when the
opportunity

arose.

The Act was passed in May, 1991, and several county and city
officials in the region began to consider cooperation immediately upon its
passage, and even before the regional needs assessments were begun.
According to those involved in early negotiations, the motivation for seeking
a cooperative solution was purely economic.

They all foresaw that solid

waste management was about to become a really big and expensive issue,
and were convinced that it would be prohibitively costly for each county to
operate an individual Subtitle D landfill handling a low volume of waste.
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In

their opinion, the legislation just put parameters on what the region's task
would be.
In December 1991, the Fayetteville City Manager and the Tullahoma
City Manager requested a meeting with officials from Coffee County, Lincoln
County and Moore County.

After this initial meeting, Moore County failed

to make a commitment to the regional concept and began to make plans
independently.

When Moore County elected not to participate, Lincoln and

Coffee Counties asked representatives from Franklin County to attend their
next meeting.

In these meetings, they discussed specific criteria that each

county would need to firmly commit to in order to participate in a multi
county region. The Coffee County Commission wanted to require that each
county commit a bond in the amount of $100,000,

and each city

participating independently of their respective county commit to a $50,000
bond. While other participating counties felt this amount rather steep, they
reluctantly agreed, reasoning that such a significant financial obligation
showed a high level of commitment to the success of the regional effort.
Other requirements for membership in the multi-county

region included

mandatory acceptance of a regional public landfill in their county, if this was
revealed to be the most economically efficient solution and that site was
selected as the most economically and geologically feasible site for the
landfill.

No member county could refuse to host a regional facility, if it was

clearly in the best interest of the region.
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Another area addressed in these

early discussions was individual representation in the region.

Each

participating county and city in the region would have an equal number of
representatives on the regional board.

Representation was irrespective of

population or size. Members felt that this assured fairness to all parties and
prohibited larger counties and cities from taking advantage of smaller
counties and cities.

Decision makers felt strongly that all participants stood

to gain economically from cooperation, even cities and counties generating
larger amounts of waste, and that equality in the region irrespective of size
was imperative for successful cooperation.
The participants then set a deadline, approximately

March 1992, for

each county to discuss alternatives and make a commitment.

Entities

making the commitment were Lincoln County, Franklin County, and
Tullahoma.

Since Tullahoma is located in both Coffee and Franklin

Counties, they had the option to choose which of the two they wanted to
be the responsible county, as allowed by the Act.

When Coffee County

refused to commit by the deadline, the region participants then began to
consider other logical partners.

One potential partner was Giles County, and

a representative from Lincoln County approached officials from Giles County
at the next scheduled development district meeting .. Giles County had made
no prior efforts to address the solid waste issue. Local leaders were very
concerned about the expense of handling the issue alone and thus were
very eager to join the multi-county

region.
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It took Coffee County three

months to decide not to participate in the region, but took Giles County only
two weeks to make the decision and go through all the proper channels
(e.g., getting County Commission approval, making the financial
commitment,

etc.) to officially become a member of the Inter-local Solid

Waste Authority.
The interested parties then drew up an agreement that had to be
signed by all parties (the respective county commissions or city councils) to
join the planning region, called the "Inter-local Agreement to Establish an
Inter-local Solid Waste Cooperative Board."

The inter-local agreement was

actually signed by the last of the necessary parties on July 20, 1992.

An

"inter-local agreement" is a type of legal arrangement that allowed them to
go ahead and start working cooperatively,

although the state had not yet

set up guidelines for forming an authority and although it was technically
too early to form a multi-county

solid waste region. The Act required that

regions be formed between October and December, 1992.

There was a

resolution contained in the inter-local agreement that allowed the newly
formed Inter-local Solid Waste Cooperative Board to automatically

convert to

a planning region and an authority when the time came. The inter-local
agreement was a legal construct that allowed the region to fast-track
forming an authority, and was operative for two years, or until an authority
was formed.

This also saved region members the inconvenience of going

before each individual commission and council again; the board formed
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through inter-local agreement was granted decision-making

power.

Tullahoma only formally became an entity and a full-fledged member of the
region, facing the same requirements as a county, when the actual authority
was established in October, 1992.
Technical support in the decision making process was provided from
several sources.

The Southcentral Tennessee Development District solid

waste consultant provided useful information that compared the cost of
independent provision of disposal to regional provision of disposal.

Simple

handouts and hard numbers were critical in educating county commissioners
and helping them understand the alternatives.

Solid waste consultants with

CT AS also provided cost information that influenced the decision of the
counties.

Perhaps the most important assistance the region received,

however, was the expertise of the Municipal Technical Assistance Service
(MTAS) legal counsel.
constructed,

At the time that the inter-local agreement was

the Act and its requirements and implications were still not

well-understood

by many state agencies responsible for implementation.

The MT AS legal consultant, working at the time with the cities of
Fayetteville and Tullahoma, took the time and made the effort to dig into the
law and understand the Act.

She was responsible for "finding"

the loophole

that would allow them to begin work as a region (i.e., the inter-local
agreement), and for drawing up the agreement.

Everyone involved in the

decision making that was interviewed felt strongly that having a legally
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binding contract was paramount to the success of the region.

If partners

are required to make a binding commitment, they must be serious about
solving a problem and saving money.
By forming a region of at least three counties, each county was
eligible for the maximum planning grant, $20,000.
planning grant for the region was $60,000,

instead of the combined grant of

$45,000 if each county had formed a single-county
their resources.

So, the combined

region and then pooled

While the extra planning grant money was certainly a

benefit of multi-county
decision influence.

cooperation, the amount made it insignificant as a

According to one county commissioner involved in the

decision process, "Once we [the county commission] realized what it was
going to cost, especially if we were by ourselves, that extra money was just
a drop in the bucket."
with the $350,000

The authority pooled the $60,000 in planning grants

initially guaranteed by each county and city ($100,000

per county, $50,000 per city) to cover feasibility studies, plan development,
and other region expenses.
C Organization and Activities
In October, 1992, the Inter-local Solid Waste Cooperative Board
officially became the Inter-local Solid Waste Authority.

The authority was

formed according to Part 9 of the 1991 Act, and is thus a "Part 9
Authority",

which grants the authority unprecedented autonomy and

responsibility in order that regional solid waste management services may
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be expedited, economized, and consolidated (TDEC, Div. of SWA, "Fact
Sheet", 1995).

A Part 9 Authority is an independent governmental entity

with powers that include the right to (a) sue and be sued, (b) acquire
personal and real property and exercise the power of eminent domain, (c)
enter into contracts, (d) issue bonds, (el incur debt, (fl employ agents and
. pay compensation to employees, (g) set tipping fees and surcharges, and (h)
review permits for new facilities.

An "advisory board" was formed that was

composed of one representative from every entity involved in the authority.
The official Authority Board of Directors was limited to 1 5 members by the
1991 Act, though the authority was composed of 17 local entities.

So, one

representative (a county commissioner, city alderman, city manager, or
mayor) from each entity except two was officially appointed to the board.
In practice, the Authority Board was a rubber stamp for votes and decisions
made by the larger advisory board.
The first action of the board was to hire a consulting firm to perform
feasibility studies to determine the most appropriate disposal solution for the
region, and to develop a ten-year solid waste management plan for the
region. The combined region produced 86,870 tons per year of MSW, or
348 tons per day (based on 250 disposal days per year). The consulting
firm developed a cost and feasibility comparison of three alternative disposal
scenarios: ( 1) the authority sites, builds, and operates a regional public
landfill in the most economically and geographically feasible location, (2) the
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authority contracts with a private firm to construct and operate a landfill in
the region, and (3) the authority contracts with a private firm for
transportation

and disposal outside the region. Compliance with the Act

required capacity assurance and planning for the next ten years.

From its

inception, though, the Inter-local region was looking for an even longer-term
solution to waste management, and the criteria used by the consulting firm
to compare alternative scenarios was disposal assurance for twenty years.
After consideration of all relevant factors, the consulting firm selected five
potential sites for location of a public or private regional landfill, with the
first choice site located in Lincoln County, near Fayetteville.

As is typically

the case with siting a landfill, citizen emotions and involvement quickly
reached a peak level. When this information was presented to the Authority
Board, whose meeting happened to be in Fayetteville that evening, over 150
citizens were in attendance, and all were opposed to locating a regional
landfill near Fayetteville.

But the Authority

Board, including representatives

from Fayetteville held steadfast to the commitment to serve as host if they
were fairly selected based on economic and geologic feasibility.
Because of the large volume of waste generated by the entire region,
they were able to gain significant leverage in soliciting bids for private
disposal and increased competition among potential private providers.

The

most economically feasible option was eventually shown to be a twenty
year contract with a large private firm for construction
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of one transfer

station in each county and one in Tullahoma, transportation,

and disposal in

the firm's private regional landfill outside the Inter-local Authority's
boundaries.

The disposal price is set for the next ten years. The private

firm has the option of re-negotiation for the remaining ten years.

Everyone

involved in the process, including technical advisors, is convinced that the
Inter-local Authority was able to negotiate a long-term solution much more
cost effectively

with a larger waste base than each member could have

done individually.

In fact, there has been evidence of at least one private

firm trying to prevent region formation, in order to command a higher price
for contracts with individual jurisdictions.

When efforts of the private firm

failed to prevent formation of the Part 9 Authority,

the firm began to try to

lure individual cities away from the region by promising very low disposal
rates offered for short-term contracts.

The Inter-local Authority

is currently

involved in a lawsuit against one municipality in Giles County that breached
the contract negotiated by the authority when they signed a short-term
contract with a competing firm.

Although the small municipality does not

generate a significant volume of waste, the authority feels that it is
imperative for the future success of the region that each entity be bound by
the decisions of the authority.
The Inter-local Authority

is also open to accepting new members.

Early in 1994, the city of Shelbyville, located in Bedford County, analyzed
the cost of alternatives for providing MSW management, and came to the
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Inter-local Authority expressing an interest in joining the authority.
were subject to the same commitments

They

required by each original member,

and officially became a member of the Inter-local Authority

in March, 1994.

The activities of the Inter-local Authority extend beyond disposal
assurance into all aspects of solid waste management.

The authority

recently hired a regional solid waste education coordinator to work with all
18 entities in the region. This person serves as a resource and provides
support for individual education efforts in the region. The authority charges
each member a fee of $.49/ton to fund the regional education coordinator.
Now that the disposal issue is settled, the authority is concentrating

their

efforts on recycling and are in the early stages of developing a regional
recycling plan. They see potential advantages in marketing their recyclable
products by pooling their tonnage, but a regional MRF does not seem
economically feasible at this point. They are also focusing attention on the
possibility of a regional composting project but have no definite plans yet.
There are still some aspects of solid waste management that seem most
efficiently

handled by individual entities.

Each jurisdiction

responsible for collection and transportation

in the authority is

to the nearest transfer station.

Disposal of tires is also handled individually by each county, but the
authority is looking at alternatives for a more economical regional solution
for management of waste tires.
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D Lessaos Learned
The case of the Inter-local Solid Waste Authority
contrast to the cases previously presented.

provides a stark

The most striking difference is

the pro-active role the authority assumed in all aspects of solid waste
management.

Even before all of the state's guidelines were in place, the

authority, then working as a cooperative board, had already made
significant progress toward regional cooperation.

One factor that

contributed toward the success of the region was past experience in solid
waste cooperation, even though the cooperative effort actually failed.

In

fact, failure of past efforts may have made decision makers even more
committed to ensuring successful cooperation when the opportunity
Sometimes, knowing what

arose.

not to do may be just as important as knowing

what to do, and the previous failure of the incinerator project provided
decision makers with knowledge of some of the factors that contribute
toward cooperation failure.

Those involved in the earlier project knew how

important it was to keep the project moving and resolve conflicts in a timely
manner.
Another factor that contributed to successful regional cooperation
was the presence of cooperation entrepreneurs.

The Fayetteville City

Manager and the Tullahoma City Manager played crucial roles in cooperation
success by devoting significant amounts of time to conflict resolution and
progress of the region. Often, it is county commissioners or city councilmen
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who are ultimately responsible for making decisions about solid waste
management.

Most of these, though, are not career public servants, but

have outside, demanding jobs and serve the county or city interests in their
spare time.

As evidenced by the former failure of the incinerator project in

the region, small amounts of continual progress are required for long-term
regional success.

These cooperation entrepreneurs facilitated establishment

of a cooperation infrastructure.

When problems or questions arose, they

served as a foundation for the region where such issues could be
immediately addressed, instead of having to wait as long as a month for the
next commission or council meeting.

Another contribution

of the

cooperation entrepreneurs was to provide a persistent source of education
among changing faces of decision makers. As the faces of elected officials
change, it is necessary to continually educate them about why and how
certain decisions were made. A persistent source of re-education is required
to bring new players up to speed on the economics behind alternatives
chosen and alternatives not chosen.
Having a tight legal construct that binds all members to agreed-upon
terms was critical to the Inter-local Authority's
those involved in the process.

success, in the opinion of

And in retrospect, requiring a substantial

financial obligation by all participants really solidified the commitment
each partner to region success.

of

From its inception, the focus of the Inter

local region has always been a long-term solution to solid waste
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management.

Requiring a binding commitment of any potential member

was symbolic of the long-term vision.

It is important to note, however, that

this would have been impossible to achieve without the legal expertise of
the MT AS legal consultant who invested considerable time and effort
required to interpret and understand the law and its implications.

While the

initial price of developing a legally binding authority was high in terms of
transaction costs, i.e., it required significant legal expertise, and involved a
considerable amount of negotiation on the part of decision makers involved,
it actually reduced transaction costs in the long run. These initial
transaction costs were largely offset by MT AS resources, or an independent
third party broker without a direct stake in the outcome or its implications.
Once the authority was in place, it established the institutional

arrangements

necessary to facilitate progress toward cooperation.
The previous two cases provided examples of how a private third
party may be able to reduce transaction costs and political risk associated
with cooperating.

A private firm's focus on profit maximization may lead

them to foster informal cooperation.

The Inter-local case, however,

illustrates another aspect of the involvement of a private profit maximizing
firm.

A private interest may either facilitate or impede cooperation,

depending upon the outcome with respect to private industry's
maximization objective.

While they may benefit from facilitating

profit
informal

cooperation, they may see disadvantages in formal multijurisdictional
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cooperation in municipal solid waste management.

When local entities band

together formally, they may be able to gain significant leverage in
negotiating with private firms.

It would be advantageous for a private firm

to keep local jurisdictions independent and negotiate separate short-term
contracts.

When local entities form a unified front, they may also be able to

gain significant leverage in influencing policy.

Strong local regions may be

able to exercise flow control, or even influence policy makers to develop
legislation or regulations that allow them more authority or leverage.

It is

likely that if local jurisdictions do not organize and influence regulations in a
manner advantageous to them, private industry will organize and attempt to
influence them in their favor.
Almost everyone interviewed regarding this case remarked that they
were very pleased with the outcome of regional cooperation in MSW
management.

They believe they were able to negotiate a disposal contract

that would otherwise have been unachievable.

They also feel like benefits

may be gained in the future through cooperation in other aspects of solid
waste management, as these programs begin to develop.

Further, the

region partners expressed that everything is now in place to facilitate
cooperation in other matters outside solid waste management.

The initial

investments in terms of transaction costs and political risk that were
required to establish a regional cooperative effort in MSW have produced
externalities including trust among members, shared vision, and comraderie.
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If a proposal regarding another issue were to come along in which all
potential partners could see tangible benefits of cooperating,

as in the case

of solid waste, development of a cooperative relationship would be much
easier and more efficient.

5. SOUTHEAST TENNESSEE SOLID WASTE REGION
A History and Background Information
The Southeast Tennessee Solid Waste Region is comprised of the ten
counties that are members of the Southeast Tennessee Development
District: Bledsoe, Bradley, Grundy, Hamilton, Marion, McMinn, Meigs, Polk,
Rhea, and Sequatchie Counties.

The region is very diverse in terms of

population, geography, rurality, and economic activity.

A map of the region

location may be found in Figure 8, and Figure 9 highlights selected
characteristics

of each county.

The city of Chattanooga is located in

Hamilton County and has a population of 152,466.

Hamilton County in the

Southeast Tennessee Region is part of the Chattanooga Metropolitan
Statistical Area (along with three north Georgia counties), which has a
population of 399,487.

Counties in the region range from very rural

Sequatchie, Bledsoe and Polk Counties to metropolitan Hamilton County,
with several counties such as Bradley, McMinn, and Marion containing a
rural/urban mix.
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Figure 8. Southeast Tennessee Solid Waste Region
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Figure 9. Characteristics of Southeast Tennessee Solid Waste Region.
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Prior to the passage of the 1991 Solid Waste Management Act, the
status of waste management activities in the region varied greatly.

On one

end of the spectrum, Hamilton County produced almost 1,800 tons per day
of MSW and had a private Subtitle D landfill, curbside garbage collection for
almost all of its residents, curbside recyclables collection for many of its
residents and drop-off recycling available elsewhere, a full-time solid waste
director, and a full-time recycling and waste education director.

On the

other end of the spectrum, Grundy County produced 18 tons per day of
MSW and operated a small public landfill that did not meet Subtitle D
regulations.

Grundy County provided green boxes for drop-off collection of

garbage with no opportunity to recycle.

The remaining eight counties had a

solid waste management program somewhere between Hamilton County's
and Grundy County's.

Three of the ten counties (Meigs, Polk and

Sequatchie) did not have a landfill.

Six of the counties had landfills, but all

were scheduled for closure by March of 1994, when Subtitle D regulations
were originally scheduled to become effective.

Of these six counties,

Bradley and McMinn had already applied for permits for construction

of a

new Class I landfill compliant with Subtitle D.
The relationship among counties in the Southeast Tennessee
Development District (STDD) is rather unique.

Development district boards

are comprised of the county executives from each member county, and
each member (and thus each county) has equal representation on the board.
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Prior to passage of the 1991 Solid Waste Management Act, all counties in
the STDD had a very good working relationship and were closely tied
through the development district.

The overarching theme in the STDD can

be compressed into, "What's good for Chattanooga is good for all of us,
and what's good for any county is good for Chattanooga."

The

development district Director and Assistant Director have been in place for
over 15 years, and have gained the trust and respect of all member
counties.

In fact, more than one district county executive described the

development district director as, "a conflict resolution genius."

Elected

officials in the member counties view the STDD as a resource that has the
staff and expertise to provide sound advice and services that each county
can't provide individually.
One example of the cooperative spirit among STDD member counties
is the recent siting of a bridge across the Tennessee River. The Tennessee
River passes through five counties in the STDD (Marion, Hamilton, Rhea,
Meigs, and McMinn), and the state agreed to fund construction

of a bridge

in one of the five counties, on the condition that the five counties could
agree where the bridge should be placed.

For most counties, such a

condition would not easily be met. Through STDD negotiations,

however,

the five counties were able to meet and agree upon the site of the bridge
within one month.

They even negotiated a package deal which included a

guarantee for state funding of a second bridge in the region within the next
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five years. Another cooperative project currently under development is a
regional water system, whereby all of the utility districts in the region will be
linked.

In addition, several joint economic development projects have been

undertaken.
B Decision Process
Even before passage of the 1991 Solid Waste Management Act, the
solid waste issue had been a topic of much discussion in STDD monthly
board meetings.

The STDD staff had been watching the development of the

legislation closely and made each county executive aware of likely changes
they would face in the future management of MSW. Once the legislation
passed and the state notified each county executive of specific requirements
of the Act, the first reaction of each county executive was to put this on
the agenda for discussion at the next STDD Board meeting.
At this meeting of the STDD Board, they discussed requirements of
the Act and alternatives allowed under the Act.

Upon counsel from the

STDD staff, they all agreed that this issue could best be handled as a group,
rather than individually.

Several factors contributed to this decision.

was the economics of solid waste disposal.

First

Most of the county executives

that currently operated a small public landfill not compliant with Subtitle D
were convinced that it would be nearly impossible for each of them to
continue to provide disposal individually.
grant incentive to form multi-county

Another factor was the planning

regions.
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Each county knew that it

would be difficult to have a plan completed for $15,000.
their resources as a multi-county

But if they pooled

region, they would have $200,000

would be able to hire an outside consultant to develop the plan.

and

Perhaps

the most significant factor, however, was encouragement from development
district staff who assured them that forming a multi-county

solid waste

region was in their best interest and they could make it work.
One way the development district staff was able to help make the
region work was through modification of the generic resolution drafted by
the state to establish a multi-county
work effectively,
win-win situation.
cooperation,

solid waste region.

For the region to

each county had to view membership in the region as a
They had to be able to see tangible benefits of

but not at the cost of losing control over their destiny.

Over

the course of several months early in 1992, the resolution for formation of a
multi-county
compromises.

region underwent numerous changes as necessary to allow
The resolution was amended to emphasize that each county

in the region would not be required by the region to do anything that was
not in the county's best interest.

The final result was a rather loose

arrangement that allowed each county to retain ultimate control of solid
waste management in their county.
Once an acceptable resolution was drafted, the county executives,
along with the STDD staff, began to "sell" the idea to each individual county
commission, which was required to approve the resolution.
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County

executives cited two factors that were of critical importance in selling the
region to individual county commissions.

The first was a set of handouts

developed by the development district, with help from CT AS, that very
simply showed realistic projected future costs of handling solid waste
independently in a manner compliant with federal and state regulations.
Presenting economic benefits in a two-page summary written in easily
understood language was a very effective strategy for quickly educating
local decision makers of the task before them.

The second factor was

assurance by the individual county executive and development district staff
that passage of the resolution would not usurp any local control.

Local

officials were assured that they could not be forced by the region to do
anything they didn't judge to be in their best interest.
Most counties in the region agreed to the resolution relatively quickly
and with relatively little controversy.
region was Marion County.

The last county to agree to join the

At the time the Act was passed, Marion County

had a landfill that handled 39 tons per day with a remaining life of 36 years,
but was not compliant with Subtitle D. There was a great deal of denial
about Subtitle D regulations, so it was very difficult to convince citizens and
local decision makers that their disposal situation was not under control for
the next 36 years. Another factor that led to controversy over joining the
region was past experience with a large private company that wanted to
construct a hazardous waste incinerator in the county.
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Due to the earlier

controversy,

citizens were intensely opposed to importing waste into the

county, and it required a great deal of education to convince them that
membership in the region was not equivalent to importation of waste.

After

considerable educational efforts, the county passed the resolution and
completed the ten-county Southeast Tennessee Solid Waste Region.
Benefits to many of the smaller counties that were facing major,
expensive changes in the area of solid waste management are relatively
straightforward.

Small counties stood to gain from regional cooperation by

potentially reducing the cost of disposal, affording a professional consultant
to develop their ten-year solid waste plan, or potentially gaining a market for
recyclables, to name a few areas. Hamilton County, on the other hand,
already had a well-developed solid waste management program and had the
staff and technical expertise to develop a ten-year plan, so it is more
difficult to see the benefits to the largest county in the region of joining nine
other smaller counties that would likely draw resources away from them.
the opinion of Hamilton County and Chattanooga decision makers,
cooperative solid waste management was more a policy issue than a solid
waste issue. Economic development in Chattanooga and Hamilton County
is in large part dependent upon economic stability in surrounding counties.
Since Hamilton County already had solid waste management under control
and since the region couldn't force any undesirable solutions upon them,
they viewed cooperation as a win-win solution because other counties
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In

"win" by drawing upon the resources of Chattanooga and Hamilton County
in managing their solid waste without harming Chattanooga or Hamilton
County, and Chattanooga and Hamilton County "win" not in the solid waste
issue, but in the future economic viability of the entire "Chattanooga
region".
According to state guidelines, regional solid waste boards were
limited to a maximum of 15 members. The Southeast Tennessee Solid
Waste Regional Board was designed to work closely with the STDD. The
board is composed of nine county executives (which is 90% of the STDD
Board membership), three city representatives (one from Chattanooga, one
from Cleveland in Bradley County, and one from Pikeville in Bledsoe
County), and three city managers selected by the city manager's association
(one from Athens in McMinn County, one from Signal Mountain and one
from Red Bank, both in Hamilton County).

The one county without

representation from the county executive is Bledsoe County, which is the
reason for appointment of a Pikeville representative.

Solid waste regional

board meetings were generally scheduled to coincide with STDD Board
meetings at the site of the STDD office in Chattanooga.
C Organization and Activities
The resolution creating the Southeast Tennessee Solid Waste Region
was not intended to form a tight legal bond among all ten counties.
intention of member counties forming the region appeared to be ( 1)

104

The

cooperation in developing a ten-year plan, and (2) cooperation in certain
aspects of solid waste management that were agreeable to all entities.
intention was not for all ten counties to cooperate in joint disposal.
area of disposal, several "mini-regions"

The

In the

have been created within the

Southeast Tennessee Region, with the economics of solid waste disposal
driving the decisions to cooperate.
Polk Counties.

One example is McMinn, Meigs, and

When Subtitle D regulations were enacted, McMinn County

negotiated an arrangement with Meigs County and Polk County to accept
their waste for disposal in a Subtitle D landfill.

They expect the current

arrangement to ensure disposal capacity for all three counties for the next
20-35 years.
Another mini-region for disposal is composed of Marion, Grundy,
Bledsoe, and Sequatchie Counties.

As previously noted, Marion County had

a large landfill not compliant with Subtitle D prior to passage of the 1991
Act.

When Marion County realized that they were facing tremendous costs

to close the landfill in 1994 and would be required to find an alternative
disposal solution, they were forced to consider importation of out-of-county
waste.

By accepting all the waste they could, from both private sources

and other counties, they were able to fill up the existing landfill quickly and
raise funds to close the old landfill and construct a new Subtitle D landfill.
After successfully operating as a defacto region, Marion County plans to
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continue to accept waste from Grundy, Sequatchie, and Bledsoe Counties at
the new Subtitle D landfill.
A major selling point of the regional concept was that no county
could be forced to manage waste in a manner inconsistent with their
objectives or desires. One evidence of this is the disposal situation in Rhea
County.

Rhea County generates approximately 90 tons per day for disposal,

and operated a public landfill until it was forced to close in 1996 due to
noncompliance with Subtitle D regulations.

McMinn County offered to allow

Rhea County to export waste to McMinn County's Subtitle D landfill.
However, Rhea County felt very strongly that it was imperative for them to
have their own landfill.
of-county waste.

They were also strongly opposed to importing out

Rhea County is currently in the process of obtaining a

permit to construct and operate a Subtitle D landfill in their county able to
handle their 90 tons per day for the next 20 years.

Most estimates project

that it will cost Rhea County nearly $60 per ton to dispose of waste at a
new county landfill, opposed to the offer for disposal in McMinn County's
landfill at a price of $35 per ton.

Other members of the region, however,

support the decision of Rhea County, and feel like it is their prerogative to
handle disposal in the manner they view as most appropriate.

Disposal

flows for MSW in the Southeast Tennessee Solid Waste Region are shown
in Figure 10. The region is currently served by five Subtitle D landfills, two
of which are regional in nature.

Several counties within the region are also
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Figure 10. MSW Disposal Flows in the Southeast Tennessee Solid Waste Region.

cooperating in disposal of Class Ill/IV wastes, and these flows are depicted
in Figure 11 .
Collection of waste has been left up to each individual county.

The

status of collection efforts in the region is portrayed in Figure 12. Two
counties, Hamilton and McMinn, are serviced entirely by either public or
private collection.

In all other counties except Rhea and Grundy, at least

some collection is provided, usually by cities and sometimes by a small
private collector.

Populations not serviced by pick-up have drop-off

convenience centers available to them.

While collection of recyclables has

been left up to individual counties, the region has worked cooperatively
process recyclables and market them.

to

The Orange Grove Recycling Center

is a non-profit MRF located in Chattanooga.

All participating counties

donate collected recyclables to the MRF where they are processed and
marketed.

The region is currently working on a data base for industrial

recycling, both end users and suppliers.

Figure 13 portrays recyclables

collection in the Southeast Tennessee region. One area of solid waste that
has yet to be fully addressed is solid waste education, although the region
plans to handle education on a region-wide scale. They plan to pool state
educational grants to hire an education coordinator for the entire region, and
use region-wide media outlets to disseminate information.
Regional ties have afforded opportunities for informal cooperation in
several areas. One example is tire disposal.
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Figure 11. Class Ill/IV Disposal Flows in the Southeast Tennessee Solid Waste Region.

i:!f# of Convenience Centers
Curbside Pick-up

McMinn
.
}

Grundy
......
......
0

Hamilton
Marion

~
Bradley

Figure 12. Collection Efforts in the Southeast Tennessee Solid Waste Region

Polk

~

Recycling at Conv. Centers
-----"'\

Curbside Pick-up

O

Drop-off Recycling

0
McMinn

., '

Grundy
\

0

e
Hamilton
Marion

0

0

Bradley

Figure 13. Collection Efforts in the Southeast Tennessee Solid Waste Region

Polk

Bradley County approached the McMinn County Executive and asked if they
would consider a tire disposal contract, which they eagerly accepted.
Through the McMinn County Executive's involvement with the regional
board, he was aware that Marion County was having a problem with tire
disposal.

So he contacted the Marion County Executive and informed him

of the Bradley County-based company looking for tires.

Within a few days,

Marion County also had their tire problem solved.
D I essaos Learned

Success of the Southeast Tennessee Solid Waste Region is largely a
result of previous cooperative relationships through the development
district, and trust earned through a long relationship between the
development district and its member counties.

The driving force behind

cooperation in this case is not a cooperation entrepreneur, or individuals
with a stake in the problem who facilitate establishment of a regional
infrastructure

able to accommodate the process of cooperation, as in the

Inter-local case. The driving force, or rather the glue that helped form the
region and hold it together was the development district, which served as a
"cooperation cornerstone",

or a continual, steady base upon which

cooperation was built. This case seems to pick up where the Inter-local
case ended. Trust and confidence, comraderie, and strong ties were already
in existence in the STDD prior to passage of the Solid Waste Management
Act in 1991.
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One would expect that such a large number of counties, with diverse
characteristics

and significant distance among them, would face significant

transaction costs associated with developing relationships necessary to
facilitate multi-county

cooperation.

However, when the opportunity

arose

to cooperate in MSW management, counties in the STDD faced much lower
transaction costs than many other counties considering cooperation.

Many

of the transaction costs required to cooperate in solid waste management
had already been invested in the development district through cooperation
on previous issues. The relationship established in the development district
also lowered the political risk associated with multi-county

cooperation.

But

this relationship that was previously established only existed because
member counties had been willing to give up some local autonomy and had
been willing to increase their level of political risk at some prior time to
establish development district relationships.
Additionally,

members of the Southeast Tennessee Solid Waste

Region were able to educate individual decision makers about the economic
implications of the new federal and state regulations more quickly, and with
greater confidence in the estimates, because the source of the information,
the development district, had already gained credibility with individual
counties in other matters.

Also, as newly elected leaders take office, re

education is necessary, and it requires a standing, unchanging force like the
development district to provide continual education and consistency.
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Generally, the benefits of cooperation have been identified as a form
of potential cost savings.

Another benefit of cooperation not previously

noted is that identified by Chattanooga: future economic stability in the
surrounding region and an economic environment in the entire region that
will help promote the future interests of Chattanooga.

Although they did

not receive a direct benefit from cooperation among all ten counties, they
viewed cooperation as a Pareto improvement for the region as a whole.

At

least one member was made better off without making them worse off, so
the move was optimal for the development district as a whole.

Beneficiaries

of direct economic benefits were counties like Bledsoe and Sequatchie.

As

the private consulting firm was developing the regional plan,. Bledsoe and
Sequatchie wanted to explore the possibility of siting a joint landfill in
Bledsoe County.

So the consultants conducted a feasibility study and found

that it would be prohibitively costly.

But without cooperation and the

expertise of a consulting firm at their disposal, Bledsoe and Sequatchie
Counties would probably not have been able to undertake such a feasibility
study, on which they were able to make sound economic decisions about
the management of solid waste in their respective counties.
Two factors seemed to be crucial in "selling" cooperation to individual
county commissions and local decision makers. One was the flexibility
allowed by the resolution forming the region. Through the development
district, county executives had been able to draft a resolution that allowed
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cooperation as a multi-county

region, but also allowed individual decision

making, and essentially gave each county veto-power

in their county.

Successful inclusion of such flexibility again may be attributed to confidence
and trust in the development district and their ability to "look out for" each
member.

Another selling point was quick, simple education of local

officials.

Seeing the benefits in hard numbers in a simple format, and from a

credible source, facilitated cooperation.
While the situation in the STDD has proven beneficial for members
faced with solid waste management requirements, and has facilitated
cooperation in solid waste management, as well as other areas, it is
important to examine the stability of the development district relationship.
Further questioning about the trust and confidence in the development
district revealed that the root of the trust and confidence is not the
development district, but the development district director.

This individual

has been able to provide a base of support for all counties and has been
able to consistently

help in resolving conflicts among member counties.

When interviewees were asked what would happen to the Southeast
Tennessee Solid Waste Region if the development district director was to
leave his post of 15 years, all but one responded that it would likely remain
intact until the next election, and then probably cease to exist.
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6. BENTON-CARROLL-HENRY SOLID WASTE REGION
A History and Backgrrnmd lofarroatiao
Benton, Carroll and Henry Counties are located in Northwest
Tennessee, as shown in Figure 14. Selected characteristics

of each county

are shown in Figure 15. The eastern border of Henry and Benton Counties
is the Tennessee River, and recreation associated with the river is a major
feature of both counties.

Paris Landing State Park is located in the

northeast corner of Henry County, and the county seat is Paris, home of the
world's largest fish fry.

Nathan Bedford Forrest State Historic Area is

located in central Benton County, along the river, and the county seat is
Camden. The county seat for Carroll County is Huntingdon, located in the
center of the county.

Carroll County is home to half of the Natchez Trace

State Park and Forest, in the southeast corner of the county.

Agriculture is

a prominent feature of all three counties.
The county executives in the three counties have been active
members of the West Tennessee County Executive Committee, which is
composed of 20 rural counties in West Tennessee.

Through this committee,

the executives had regular contact and had formed a working relationship.
Prior to the solid waste issue, Benton, Carroll and Henry Counties had
formed a tri-county

industrial region, but relatively little was accomplished

through this venture.
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Figure 14. Benton-Carroll-Henry Solid Waste Region
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Solid waste had been an active issue in the region even before the
1991 Solid Waste Management Act surfaced.

In the early 1970's Henry

County constructed a landfill and contracted a private firm for collection and
disposal.

This landfill was in addition to an existing landfill owned and

operated by the city of Paris. There were constant complaints about the
landfill, and citizen pressure forced its closure in the late 1970's.

This left

Henry County with nowhere to dispose of MSW, so they negotiated an
arrangement with the city of Paris for disposal.

This arrangement continued

until Subtitle D regulations were enacted and it became apparent that the
Paris landfill would have to close. The city of Paris was interested in
building a new Subtitle D landfill.
Carroll County faced a very similar situation.

They were serviced by

a small public county landfill that was nearing capacity and would be forced
to close in 1994 under new Subtitle D regulations.

In 1989, they

approached the county executives of Weakley, Crockett, Henry, Benton,
Henderson, and Decatur Counties individually through the West Tennessee
County Executives Association about the possibility of regional cooperation
in siting a new Subtitle D landfill in Carroll County, but were never able to
move beyond initial interest.

At the time, Carroll County had a strong desire

for a landfill in their county, but realized that future landfills would have to
draw from a larger waste base to operate at a level near minimum average
cost.

The lack of initiative on the part of neighboring counties was due to
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the short-sighted view of solid waste disposal at that time.

Counties

approached by Carroll County already had a disposal arrangement in place,
and the Solid Waste Management Act had not yet been drafted.

Since there

was no disposal crisis at this point, there was no incentive to address solid
waste disposal pro-actively.
Benton County had operated a public landfill that was also facing
eminent closure due to Subtitle D. Prior to 1990, the county executive of
Benton County persuaded the county commission to purchase a 500 acre
tract for development of a new Subtitle D landfill, but the county executive
did not seek re-election in the 1990 election.

When the new executive and

commissioners took office in 1990, two developers from Benton County
approached the County Commission and offered Benton County ten years of
free disposal (up to 75 tons per day) if they would grant them a permit to
purchase the land and develop and operate a landfill at the newly-acquired
site. With this agreement in place, Benton County felt that they had
disposal assurance in place when the 1991 Act was passed.
B Decision Process
When the district needs assessment was completed, the Northwest
Tennessee Development District (NTDD) presented their findings to Benton,
Carroll, and Henry Counties and recommended that they consider forming a
three-county

solid waste region. Staff of the NTDD emphasized that

forming a region only required formation of a joint plan. They would be able
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to cooperate in selected areas if it proved mutually beneficial, but would in
no way be required to cooperate if they found it was not in their best
interest.

They also emphasized that Carroll and Henry Counties had a

common disposal problem and all three counties had a common collection
problem, since most cities inside the counties provided public or private
household collection, but none of them had county-wide

collection in place.

Another factor considered was that the $60,000 they could receive in
planning grants would afford them a private consultant to handle feasibility
studies and plan development.

They also emphasized that it may be easier

to meet the 25% waste reduction goal with a three-county
would be for each county to meet the goal individually.
statutory language in the Act encouraged multi-county

region than it

Additionally,
cooperation, and so

did other technical advisors outside the NTDD, such as CTAS consultants.
Based on the recommendations of development district advisors,
decision makers in each county saw potential benefits of cooperation as a
three-county

region, so they went to their respective county commissions

for approval of a resolution creating the Benton-Carroll-Henry

Solid Waste

Region. Carroll and Henry County commissioners saw that they had a
common collection and disposal problem, knew they would not be able
financially to construct and operate a Subtitle D landfill independently,
voted for the resolution with little debate.

and

Benton County, however, viewed

their disposal problem as solved, and as a result, they were more hesitant to
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form a three-county

region.

Further encouragement from technical advisors,

however, led to passage of the resolution, after they were assured that ( 1)
formation of a region did not allow unwanted waste management practices
to be forced upon them, and (2) they stood to gain financially by planning
jointly and potentially by solving the collection problem jointly.
formed Benton-Carroll-Henry

The newly

Solid Waste Region then formed a nine-person

board, made up of three elected officials representing each of the three
counties (either county executives, mayors, county commissioners,

or city

aldermen).
C Organization and Activities
Once the region was formed, Carroll and Henry Counties hired a
private consulting firm to conduct a feasibility study to examine the
possibility of jointly siting a Subtitle D landfill to handle both counties' MSW.
The study showed that unless they could import additional waste, the cost
of developing and operating a Subtitle D landfill for the 172 tons per day
produced by Carroll and Henry Counties would be in excess of $50 per ton.
They then requested proposals for private bids for disposal services for the
two counties, and were able to negotiate a ten-year contract for a private
firm to operate a transfer station in each county and haul to their private
landfill in Obion County for disposal at a price of $21 per ton.

The city of

Paris decided to negotiate an independent contract for a transfer station at

the site of the closed Paris-Henry County Landfill and private disposal. The
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lowest bid was the same private company that contracted with Henry and
Carroll Counties, but the rate for the city of Paris was $28 per ton, $7 per
ton more than the rate negotiated by the two counties jointly.

The reason

cited for the rate difference was the volume of waste to be handled.
At about the same time that Carroll and Henry Counties were bidding
for disposal, the first conflicts emerged in the region.

When they began to

address the collection issue, each county was informed by the state through
the NTDD that they had to assure collection from 90% of all residents in the
county.

When they contacted state officials, they were told that if a county

chose to provide collection through house-to-house pick-up, they must
ensure 90% participation.

All three counties agreed that the only way this

could be accomplished was through mandatory collection.

Local decision

makers were initially distressed about forcing mandatory collection on
residents, and, as one might expect, citizens were unhappy with the
mandate and its associated cost. The region's response to citizen concern,
however, was to say that the Act required mandatory collection and they
were simply following state guidelines.
By bidding mandatory collection for all three counties together, they
were able to gain significant leverage in negotiating a contract.

With such a

volume, through a private contract, they were able to offer door-to-door
collection service to 100% of all three counties for $3. 70 per household per
month.

Resolutions mandating collection and approving the contract for
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private collection services were drawn up and scheduled to go before each
county commission, but intense citizen pressure forced local county
executives to further question the state's intentions.

Representatives of the

state then informed the counties that they were only required to make
collection service available to 90% of all households.

Representatives from

other counties unaware of the situation in the Benton-Carroll-Henry

Solid

Waste Region (BCHSWR) confirmed that indeed state officials originally
informed them that the Act required 90% collection assurance, and then
later informed them that the Act required that collection be made available
to 90% of all households.

Little imagination is required to envision the

heated debate that followed.

Citizens felt like county commissioners had

deceived them, who in turn felt like county executives had deceived them,
who in turn felt like NTDD staff had deceived them, who in turn felt like
state officials had deceived them.

Benton and Henry Counties then failed to

pass the resolution requiring mandatory collection of MSW.

Carroll County

narrowly passed the resolution requiring mandatory collection,

but at an

enormous political cost to many local elected officials.
With Carroll County's mandatory collection, a recent study estimated
that they are collecting approximately 90% of all waste generated in the
county at a cost of $3. 70 per household per month.

Henry and Benton

Counties both have an individual contract with a private firm that allows any
household in the county to pay an agreed rate and receive curbside
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collection.

It is estimated that the private firm contracted independently by

Henry and Benton Counties currently collects from only 42% of households
not serviced by city-provided
household per month.

collection, at a cost of more than $10 per

While the collection percentages are low, both Henry

and Benton Counties have significantly

increased collection percentages

since the mandatory collection debate in 1993.

Although the increase in the

percentage of generated waste that enters the managed waste stream is a
positive achievement for the two counties, it also works against achieving
the 25% waste reduction goal. The goal of reducing waste disposed in a
Class I landfill or incinerator by 25 % is based on previous waste volumes
generated.

When a larger volume of waste enters the managed waste

stream, it is difficult to measure actual reduction efforts.
Although it wasn't a bed of roses, the BCHSWR was able to resolve
conflicts created by the collection issue and the region remained intact.

But

an even more difficult issue still lay ahead, through which the region could
not remain unaltered.

As noted previously, Benton County had purchased

500 acres for construction

of a Subtitle D landfill.

The site needed a state

granted permit, and two local developers approached the county
commission with a plan for a large private firm to purchase the land and
develop and operate a new Subtitle D landfill.

In return, Benton County

would receive ten years of "free" disposal, if they would allow them to
apply for a permit for the landfill.

The commission agreed and the firm
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constructed the West Camden Landfill, which they own and operate.
Unknown to the county commission, the private firm had also negotiated a
contract with Davidson County, the location of Metro Nashville, to dispose
of over 2,000 tons per day of waste generated by Nashville.
firm committed twenty-four

The private

18-wheeler trucks to haul continuously

Davidson County to the West Camden Landfill.

Additionally,

from

the private

landfill accepts waste from several other west Tennessee counties.

To say

that citizens were upset by this action would be a serious understatement;
emotions were at an all-time high. Citizens demanded that the three-county
region stop the importation of out-of-county

waste.

But it was not in the

power of the BCHSWR to institute or monitor flow control.

The region then

began to examine the alternative of forming a Part 9 Authority.
The BCHSWR Board rotated their meeting sites, and at a meeting held
in Camden in Benton County to discuss formation of a Part 9 Authority,
over 100 citizens were in attendance and loudspeakers had to be placed in
an outside parking lot to accommodate crowds that were unable to fit into
the auditorium.

A rather insignificant resolution was put before the board,

and the six representatives from Carroll and Henry Counties voted for the
resolution, while the three representatives from Benton County voted
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against the resolution

1

.

At this point, it was revealed that a large number of

audience participants were armed, and the Henry and Carroll County
Executives had to be urgently escorted out of the meeting by armed guards.
Residents of Benton County perceived that Henry and Carroll Counties were
block voting against them, and they decided they wanted out of the region.
At this point, the ten-year plan was very near completion, so the region filed
a plan as the Benton-Carroll-Henry

Solid Waste Management Region.

However, as soon as it was possible, they split to form the Benton County
Solid Waste Region and the Carroll and Henry Solid Waste Region.
The political fallout resulting from the landfill conflict was far
reaching.

The Benton County Executive lost his health over the issue and

was not able to seek re-election.

One Benton County activist group, Protect

Our Environment Today (POET), which had very strong opinions about the
solid waste issue, was particularly influential in the upcoming local
elections, distributing thousands of letters to citizens informing them of their
version of the solid waste situation.

As a result, 22 of the 25 county

commissioners were not re-elected in the 1994 elections.

Upon dissolution

of the region, the newly-elected county commission set up a new Benton
County Solid Waste Board. Twelve of the fifteen members are newly-

1

No one interviewed could recall the exact resolution put before the region
board. However, all agreed that the resolution in question was a trivial
matter, and it was the principle of the perceived "block vote" that led to the
resulting upheaval.
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elected county commissioners.

When the county voted to terminate their

relationship with the other two region partners, they also voted to refuse all
state grants for convenience centers, collection, recycling, education, and
planning.

They are currently collecting a very low percentage of generated

waste, and residents that contract for private pick-up are paying more than
triple the price originally negotiated by the three-county

region.

Some

residents are required to drive as many as 60 miles to dispose of garbage at
the landfill.

Benton County currently has no program in place for recycling,

education, or composting.

They also anticipate a future violation of their

contract with the operators of the West Camden Landfill over expansion of
the landfill.

It is likely that through a resulting law suit, the private firm will

no longer be required to provide free disposal for Benton County's waste.
Carroll and Henry Counties continue to function as a two-county

solid

waste region, although local officials report that many political careers were
ruined over this issue and the spirit of cooperation is well below the initial
level. Both counties now have a very active recycling program and a full
time solid waste director.

Although the counties are not formally

cooperating in the areas of recycling or education, the solid waste directors
for each county have a very close working relationship, and they frequently
share information.
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D. lessons Learned
Factors that encouraged cooperation in the Benton-Carroll-Henry

case

are similar to several of those in the Inter-local and Southeast Tennessee
cases. Member counties viewed cooperation as a cost-efficient
an expensive problem.

solution to

Through cooperation, they hoped to gain an

advantage in volume that would allow them to exploit economies of scale in
collection and disposal. They also received encouragement from
development district and CTAS staff.
associated with multi-county

Additional state planning grant funds

cooperation were also a contributing

factor.

What makes this case particularly instructive is what happened after the
counties agreed to cooperate as a solid waste region.
Cases previously presented, and other studies of cooperation in solid
waste management, and cooperation in other areas, have led to
identification

of several factors that facilitate progress toward a successful

cooperative effort (e.g., Cigler, 1992; Park, 1995; Gray, 1989; DeBoer,
1995).

Several of these factors or conditions were either absent or weak in

the Benton-Carroll-Henry

case. The counties had never been involved in any

past cooperative efforts.

A weak attempt had been made to form a tri

county industrial board, but no progress was reported.

Although the county

executives had a working relationship through the West Tennessee County
Executives Association, this had not provided an opportunity
trust among the entities.

for building

Another factor that was only weakly present in
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the BCHSWR was clearly defined and widely accepted potential benefits
that may be gained from cooperation.

All counties understood that

collection and disposal of garbage in the future was going to be much more
expensive than it presently was, and they all vaguely perceived that
independent provision of collection and disposal services was not
economically feasible.

But there were never any quantitative

potential cost savings available through cooperation.

estimates of

Instead, they all just

perceived cooperation to be "cheaper" than independent provision, which
they perceived to be "expensive".
All of the decision makers involved in forming the BCHSWR were
stakeholders.

That is, they all stood to gain or lose from the outcome they

were trying to manipulate.
facilitating cooperation.

A neutral third party broker was not involved in

In the Southeast Tennessee case, the development

district fulfilled this role, and in the Inter-local case, the "cooperation
entrepreneurs"

(the Fayetteville and Tullahoma city managers and the MTAS

legal consultant) filled this role. Another factor identified as critical for
successful regional cooperation is the perception of equitable representation
in decision making and an equitable distribution of costs and benefits among
entities.

An effort was made initially by the region to assure equal

representation on the regional board. The nine-person board was composed
of three representatives of each of the three counties.

But Benton County

later perceived that the board structure allowed the other two region
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members to block vote against them.

So whether representation was equal

or not, the perception of inequality hindered progress toward cooperation.
Unlike the Inter-local Authority,

the region did not choose to form a

tight legal bond, although the region was less flexible than the Southeast
Region. The resolution that was passed to form the region was the draft
resolution formulated by the state.

One of the primary reasons for the

eventual dissolution of the region was a lack of understanding about what
the region did and did not have the power to do. In the Inter-local case,
potential regional partners met to discuss provisions of a resolution, until all
participants were satisfied that the region would meet their needs, and then
they drew up their resolution.

In the Southeast Tennessee case, the

development district used the state-provided draft resolution as a guideline,
but then amended it to reflect agreed-upon changes demanded by potential
regional partners to serve the interests of individual counties.

In both cases,

decision makers involved in forming the region were very clear about the
contents and implications of the resolutions that created the regions.
Instead of initially agreeing upon provisions of the resolution to form the
region, Benton, Carroll, and Henry Counties passed a generic resolution
drafted by state officials to form their resolution.

By doing this, they

avoided transaction costs and political risk associated with cultivating

an

agreeable resolution that met the needs of each individual jurisdiction,

and

were able to quickly form a tri-county

region.
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But the long run cost of these

early avoided transaction costs was that each entity formed their own
interpretation

of what membership in the multi-county

region implied.

When

region members were later forced to specifically define the powers of the
region, it was under circumstances of extreme duress. Transaction costs
were even higher, and also accompanied by extraordinary

political risk. The

costs of conflict resolution at this point exceeded potential benefits of multi
county cooperation.
One factor that contributed significantly to the demise of the region
was a lack of public and decision maker education with respect to sensitive
issues. When the Benton County Commission voted to grant a permit for
construction
commission's

and operation of a new landfill to a private firm, the
primary concern was that Benton County be guaranteed free

disposal at the landfill.

Although the private firm did not detail their plans

for importation of out-of-county

waste, they did nothing illegal, and were

not asked about future plans. Naivete on the part of local decision makers
was misunderstood to be intentional acceptance of imported waste when
the issue began to cause conflict.

When the issue escalated into conflict,

the public was not educated with respect to circumstances that preceded
the conflict, i.e., the county willingly granted the private firm permission to
develop the landfill.

They were also not educated about options available

for addressing the issue of flow control.
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This lack of education was then

translated into perception of a loss of all autonomy, and intense political
risk.
One final factor contributing toward failure of regional cooperation in
this case was inconsistency at the state level. Since there was no neutral
third party broker in this case, and no cooperation entrepreneur available to
facilitate conflict resolution, the region depended upon the structure set in
place by the state when the Act was passed. The primary liaison was the
development district, which dealt primarily with county executives, who in
turn worked with local decision makers. Local leaders accepted a significant
level of political risk when they agreed to put forth resolutions requiring
mandatory collection.

When the state changed collection requirements after

they had initially made them known, the only source of trust in this loose
region, the state, became untrustworthy,

and the political risk that local

leaders had accepted was translated into political failure.
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CHAPTER V

STATISTICAL MODELS

1. INTRODUCTION
Drawing upon the theoretical model previously developed and using
information learned in the case studies, an attempt is now made to develop
statistical models to explain the decision Tennessee counties made
regarding formation of solid waste regions.

After the Needs Assessments

were completed, each county had approximately
whether they would form a single-county

ten weeks to decide

solid waste region, or whether

they would join neighboring counties to form a multi-county

region.

Although the minimum allowable size for a region was a single county,
statutory

language, technical advisors, and monetary incentives all

encouraged formation of multi-county

solid waste regions.

There were no

upper limits placed on region size, provided that all region members were
contiguous counties.

The decision each Tennessee county made regarding

formation of a solid waste region provides a natural experiment in which
multi-county

cooperation in solid waste management may be examined

through statistical models.
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The objective of this section is to quantitatively

examine the decision

each county made regarding solid waste region formation,

based on the

random utility theory and the individual cases examined in previous
chapters.

To accomplish this objective, alternative models of the region

formation decision are estimated.

First, alternative specifications

of a binary

choice model are estimated using probit techniques, in which the dependent
variable is formation of a single-county
region.

region or formation of a multi-county

A poisson model is also estimated in which the actual number of

solid waste region partners a county will join is predicted.

2. DATA AND HYPOTHESES
As noted in the theoretical model previously developed, cooperation
decisions are made based on ( 1) characteristics
characteristics

of surrounding counties.

characteristics

and others' characteristics,

of the county, and (2)

But both groups, own
influence the ultimate outcome in

two ways; this is illustrated in Figure 16. First, examine the influence of a
county's own characteristics.

They directly impact the outcome by

influencing how a county values characteristics

of other counties.

For

example, if a county has a very large population, it may be less likely to
cooperate because it may be able to take advantage of economies of scale
in operational costs independently.

But this large population also colors the

way that county views characteristics

of other counties.
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Since they already
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Figure 16. Influence of Characteristics on Final Outcome.

'

have a large population base, they may not gain the same economies of
scale advantages that a small population county would by joining a
neighboring county with a large population.

Thus, they place a lower value

on contiguous counties with a high population than a county with a low
population base would.

But many counties are simultaneously

involved in

the decision process, and the final outcome is dependent upon the
interaction among individual units seeking to maximize utility.
county's own characteristics

Thus, a

also influence the final outcome because they

are a part of the set of others' characteristics for all other counties
simultaneously

involved in the decision process and cooperation negotiation.

The second group to influence the cooperation outcome is others'
characteristics.
characteristics

As illustrated in the example of population above, others'
influence a county's decision directly.

decide concurrently,

characteristics

the own characteristics

But since all counties

of surrounding counties, then become

for those other counties, influencing others'

decisions, which has implications for cooperation negotiation and the final
outcome.
In the theoretical model, characteristics

were hypothesized to

influence the utility outcome in several ways, including impacting

( 1)

operational costs characterized by economies of scale, (2) transaction costs,
(3) autonomy risk, (4) political risk, (5) a binding budget constraint,
a binding solid waste service provision constraint.

137

and (6)

Drawing upon the case

studies, this section identifies variables designed to capture these impacts of
own and others' characteristics.
Variable names, descriptions, means, standard deviations, minimum
and maximum values may be found in Table 1. MUL Tl is a dummy variable
equal to one if the county chose to participate in a multi-county

solid waste

region, and equal to zero if the county chose to be a single-county
waste region.

solid

NUMJOIN is a discrete variable equal to the number of other

counties the county chose to join in forming a solid waste region. This
discrete variable takes on a value of zero if the county formed a single
county region, one if the county joined a two-county
county joined a three-county

region, two if the

region, three if the county joined a four-county

region, and four if the county joined a ten-county region.

Data regarding

region status were supplied by the Tennessee Department of Environment
and Conservation, Division of Solid Waste Assistance.

Additional data were

accumulated in the District Needs Assessments compiled by development
district staff in each of the nine Tennessee development districts, and from
state statistical abstracts.

Counties were required to make their region

decisions prior to December 12, 1992, so the most recent economic and
solid waste data they had available to them was from 1991 . Unless
otherwise noted, all data are from 1991.
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Table 1.

Variable Means, Standard Deviations, Minimum and Maximum
Values, and Definitions.
DEFINITION

MEAN

STD DEV

1 = formed multi-county region;
0 = formed single-county region

0.47

0.50

0/1

Number of other counties joined in
forming region

1.26

1.47

0/4

POP

County population (in thousands)

51.35

105.5

4.6/826

POPCC

Population of largest neighboring
county (in thousands)

144.6

168.3

17/826

%URBAN

Percentage of county classified
urban

28.8

24.3

0/99

%URBCC

Percentage of county classified as
urban for the neighboring county
with the highest percentage urban

59.5

20.8

20/99

MINPOP

Minimum number of counties
required to reach a combined
population of 100,000

3.1

1.7

1/9

INCDIFF

Absolute value of per capita income
difference between a county and its
most similar neighbor

716.44

894.35

COMM

Number of county commissioners

17.7

5.0

9/31

COMMCC

Number of county commissioners in
the neighboring county with the
largest commission

22.6

3.6

11 /31

SUBDLF

1 = existence of Subtitle D landfill; 0
otherwise

0.43

0.50

0/1

%CCLF

Percentage of neighboring counties
with a Subtitle D landfill

45.2

24.6

0/100

%UNMAN

Potential percentage of waste
stream unmanaged

30.9

24.1

0/78

CCUNMAN

Absolute value of the difference
between the potential percentage
of unmanaged waste in a county
and its most similar neighbor

8.3

9.3

0/37

PCAPREV

Per capita total county revenue

$726. 1

133.5

322/1351

PCREVCC

Per capita revenue of the
neighboring county with the lowest
per capita revenue

$604.6

102.8

322/755

VARIABLE
JOIN
NUMJOIN
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MIN/MAX

17/4577

A Operational Costs
The theory predicts that counties producing small amounts of waste
are more likely to cooperate because they are likely to see greater cost
savings from scale economies.

Potential economies of scale cost savings

are primarily due to the declining average cost of landfilling in a subtitle D
compliant landfill up to an efficient tonnage level 1 .

While all landfilling cost

estimates for subtitle D-compliant landfills predict per ton cost savings over
larger volumes, there is not widespread agreement as to actual potential
cost savings that may be gained from an increased volume.

Economies of

scale in landfill operations are based on 1) tonnage per day received at the
facilities, 2) compaction rates achieved measured by in-place refuse
densities, 3) percentage of landfill volume taken up by dirt required for
various cover operations, and 4) average height of refuse over the liner
(CTAS, 1991 ). The average cost savings available through larger facilities
are due to the fact that more waste can be handled with relatively small

1

The economies of scale operational cost savings argument focuses
primarily on landfilling, since it is the primary method of disposal in
Tennessee. According to Steuteville, in 1994, landfilling accounted for 67
percent of all disposal nationally, with recycling accounting for 23 percent
and incineration accounting for 10 percent (Steuteville, 1994). At the time
counties were deciding region formation, there was only one permitted
operational incinerator in Tennessee, serving the Nashville area. No
additional permit applications for incinerators have been filed to date, and it
is expected that landfilling will remain the primary vehicle for final disposal
in the near future, so this application focuses on economies of scale
achievable in landfilling.
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increases in equipment and labor, and there is an inverse relationship
between the tonnage received per day and the percentage of dirt required
for cover (CTAS, 1991).
Based on a model for Tennessee developed by the Waste
Management Research and Education Institute (WMREI) in 1991, minimum
average costs per ton were approached in the range of 100-200 tons per
day, which serves a population range of approximately

35,000 to 70,000,

assuming a generation rate of 6 pounds per person per day. The model also
reveals that cost savings may be available to a greater degree for smaller
populations.

Estimated landfill costs per ton (assuming public financing, and

including fixed capital, operating, closure, and monitoring costs) for a 25
ton per day facility serving a population under 10,000 were $60.87 per ton.
As the tonnage increased to 50 tons per day for populations in the range of
15,000 to 20,000, average costs per ton decreased to $37 .82.

Costs

continued to fall to $ 24. 17 for a 100 ton per day facility, serving
approximately

35,000 people; $19.12 for a 200 ton per day facility serving

approximately

70,000, and $14.13 for a 500 ton per day facility, serving

populations over 150,000

2

.

These economies of scale are also presented

graphically in Figure 17. Similar results have been shown in numerous other
studies (e.g. Wenger and Rhyner, 1984; Dooley, et al., 1994; Renkow and

2

This assumed a clay liner, with slightly higher costs for a composite liner.
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Figure 17. Economies of Scale in Average Costs of Landfill Disposal
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Keeler, 1995; Georgia Department of Community Affairs, 1991 ), where
minimum average costs were achieved with populations ranging from
50,000 to 100,000, and tonnages ranging from 100 to 250 tons per day 3 •
According to population figures for 1991, 67% of all Tennessee
counties had a population under 35,000, and 86% of all counties had a
population under 70,000.

Of the 78 counties with an operational landfill in

1991, 54% of these processed fewer than 100 tons per day. Thus it
appears that significant cost savings due to economies of scale were
available for many Tennessee counties.

The variables POP and POPCC are

designed to capture potential operational cost savings due to economies of
scale. POP measures a county's own population in 1991, and POPCC
measures the population of the largest neighboring county.

The definition of

the POPCC variable necessarily assumes that the choice set under
consideration is only counties that share a border with the decision making
county, or its contiguous counties.

In actuality, a county may join a region

of contiguous counties, and not be required to share a border with each
member.

But while a county may consider alternatives beyond its

3

Only one known study suggests that economies of scale may be achieved
with much lower volumes. A study conducted by the Georgia
Environmental Policy Institute (GEPI) claims average cost results for landfills
in the range of 35-100 tons per day similar to those of a minimum efficient
size of 250 tons per day predicted by a model developed by the Georgia
Department of Community Affairs. However, the GEPI report has been the
subject of much controversy, and numerous inaccuracies, unsupported
claims, and impractical assumptions have been pointed out.
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contiguous counties, some limit is required for definition of a variable, and
limiting consideration to a decision making county's contiguous, or
neighboring, counties appears to be a logical way to define the choice set
which the county considers.
If counties with large populations generate a large enough solid waste
base, they may be able to take advantage of economies of scale cost
savings in disposal.

Counties with large populations also likely have the

technical expertise and resources to operate an independent disposal
facility.

They may also benefit from more competition

providers, which reduces costs (DeBoer, 1995).

by potential service

Thus one would expect

counties with large populations to be less likely to join a multi-county
waste region.

solid

However, a large population may be a desirable characteristic

from the perspective of smaller surrounding counties.

So while a large

population makes a county less likely to choose to cooperate, it may cause
other counties to desire to cooperate with it to take advantage of potential
operational cost savings.
In general, a county would be more likely to form a multi-county
waste region if at least one of its neighbors was sufficiently
potential operational cost savings.

solid

large to suggest

The variable POPCC attempts to capture

the influence of the population of contiguous counties on a county's
decision.

While the county may look favorably on partnership with larger

neighboring counties, one would expect these counties to be less likely to
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desire cooperation since they may already be taking advantage of
economies of scale in operational costs.

Thus, the expected sign on the

variable POPCC is negative, where existence of at least one very large
neighboring county indicates that surrounding counties may be less likely to
desire multi-county

cooperation.

An alternative measure for potential operational cost savings would
have been the tons of solid waste disposed.

As expected, the tons of

waste disposed and the population of a county are nearly perfectly
correlated.

However, a variable representing the tons of waste disposed

may not capture an important aspect of potential economies of scale cost
savings, which is the tons of solid waste that will have to be disposed of in
the near future.

Since Tennessee's comprehensive waste management

legislation requires a higher level of collection services than was previously
in existence, the actual tonnage of waste requiring disposal in the near
future may be significantly

higher than the tonnage collected in 1991 .

Thus, population variables may be a better indicator of potential operational
cost savings attributable to economies of scale.
B Transaction Costs
Weighing against potential economic benefits of cooperation are costs
of cooperation, which tend to be nonmonetary and are more difficult to
identify and quantify.

One such group is transaction costs which, in the

case of cooperating in forming solid waste regions, include the effort
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required to develop and maintain a cooperative relationship.

Individuals

involved in the process of developing a cooperative relationship must devote
time to make their goals and expectations known to potential region
partners.

They must develop working arrangements and agreements about

purpose, activities, leadership, responsibility, and administration.
typically involve costs of time, opportunity,
(Shaffer, p. 289, 1992).

communication,

These

and travel

Theory predicts that transaction costs associated

with developing and maintaining a multi-county

solid waste region are

negatively related to the decision to form a multi-county

region.

Not only

are transaction costs likely to be positively related to the number of counties
cooperating,

but they are likely to be increasing at an increasing rate (Kahn,

p. 46, 1995).

We expect that marginal transaction costs would increase as

a county forms a two-county

planning region, but the marginal transaction

costs would be greater as a two-county
three-county

solid waste region expands to a

solid waste region. This may be shown simply by looking at

Figure 18, which shows the increase in the number of lines of
communication

as the size of cooperative partners increases.

Due to the nature of transaction costs, it is difficult to identify a
variable that captures their influence on the decision to form a multi-county
solid waste region.

It is reasonable to expect that homogeneity between

potential cooperating counties may minimize transaction costs.

Counties

with a high degree of homogeneity likely face similar challenges in the area
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0------0
2 Counties = 1 Communication Line

4 Counties = 6 Communication Lines

3 Counties = 3 Communication Lines

8 Counties = 28 Communication Lines

Figure 18. Lines of Communication Associated With Cooperating Partners.

of solid waste management, which may make coordination of a cooperative
arrangement less costly in terms of defining goals and priorities.

One

measure of homogeneity among counties is captured by the variable
INCDIFF, which measures the absolute difference between a county's

per

capita assessed value and that of the most similar contiguous county.

A

large INCDIFF indicates that all of a county's neighbors have very different
income levels (either richer or poorer), and thus they likely have different
goals and priorities for solid waste management.

A small INCDIFF indicates

that at least one neighboring county has a similar per capita income level, so
they may require minimal effort toward developing necessary relationships
for communication

and defining goals and expectations.

The expected sign

of INCDIFF is negative; the larger the difference in income levels among
neighboring counties, the higher the transaction costs required to facilitate
cooperation, and the less likely they are to cooperate.
It is also reasonable to expect that transaction costs may be
minimized if a county has a well-developed networking and communication
link with other counties, and if they have administrative
specializing in the management of solid waste.

personnel

This may be a characteristic

of more urban counties, which serve as a hub for services and
communication

for surrounding rural counties.

The variable %URBAN

measures the percentage of the county classified as urban.

It may also be

reasonable to expect that more urban counties have a larger administrative
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staff with a higher degree of specialization and may support a staff member
dedicated to management of solid waste.

We expect that the more urban

the county, the lower the transaction costs, implying a positive relationship
between %URBAN and the decision to join a multi-county

region. The

degree to which neighboring counties are classified as urban may be an
indicator of their ability to absorb transaction costs, as well.

The variable

%URBCC measures the percentage of the neighboring county classified as
urban for the neighboring county with the highest percentage urban.

Higher

values of this variable would indicate that at least one county is highly
urban and may be more likely to desire to cooperate with a county since
they may be able to internalize many of the transaction costs associated
with forming and maintaining a multi-county

region.

As noted in the previous discussion and illustrated in Figure 18,
transaction costs increase at an increasing rate as the number of partners
increases.

The variable MINPOP, which measures the minimum number of

counties required (including your county) to reach a combined population of
100,000,

is an attempt to capture this influence.

Such a variable is based

on the observation that significant economies of scale in operational costs
are available up to a populations of approximately

100,000.

While scale

economies may be available for much larger populations also, marginal gains
diminish beyond 100,000.

Further evidence for choosing 100,000 as the

threshold was shown in the case studies, where development district staff
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initially suggested "rational waste sheds" for forming multi-county

regions,

where one of the base criteria was a combined population in the range of
100,000.

One would expect a negative sign for such a variable, based on

the notion that the smaller the number of cooperating partners required to
exploit the bulk of economies of scale available, the lower transaction costs
would be.
The variable MINPOP was calculated excluding the four largest
counties from calculation.

This is because the population of the fourth

largest county is more than twice that of the fifth largest county.
one of Tennessee's counties have populations under 125,000,
have populations above 250,000.
are significantly
characteristics

Ninety

while four

It is hypothesized that these four outliers

different enough from the remaining counties that other
may outweigh potential economies of scale cooperation

advantages.
D Autonomy
Counties generally desire to retain autonomy over the management of
their waste stream and desire to control the importation or exportation of
waste outside county borders.

The variable SUBDLF is a dummy variable

indicating whether or not a county has 1) a Subtitle D-compliant landfill in
existence, 2) a permit application on file to upgrade an existing landfill to
Subtitle D standards, or 3) a permit application on file for a new Subtitle D
landfill.

It is expected that if any of these three conditions are met, a
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county is less likely to join a solid waste region.

If a county already has a

Subtitle D landfill, or firm plans for future capacity, then they may feel that
through cooperating in a multi-county

solid waste region, they may be

forced to accept out-of county waste.

Counties with landfills may feel less

pressure to solve waste management problems, while counties without a
landfill may be less satisfied with their current waste management situation
and more inclined to join a region. Thus, existence of or plans for a landfill
may give a county the sense of autonomy over the destiny of county waste,
and thus make it less likely to join a solid waste region.
In addition to their own landfill situation, autonomy risk may also be
indicated by the landfill situation in surrounding counties.

If neighboring

counties all have Subtitle D-compliant landfills already in place, then they
are less likely to attempt to force importation of waste on a cooperating
county with a landfill.

But if neighboring counties do not have a Subtitle D

landfill, then a county may perceive a loss of autonomy through
cooperation, since cooperation may open the door for waste importation.
The variable %CCLF is an attempt to measure the autonomy risk threat
imposed by other counties by indicating the percentage of neighboring
counties that have a Subtitle D landfill in place, or firm plans to construct or
upgrade to a Subtitle D facility.

The expected sign is positive, since a

higher value would indicate that a larger percentage of neighboring counties
have their disposal problem "solved", and thus they would be less of an
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autonomy risk threat to the county, making them more likely to desire multi
county cooperation.
C Political Risk
Characteristics of MSW management make it inherently different from
many other services for which regional cooperation might be advantageous,
such as education, health care, or economic development (Park, 1995).
Solid waste facilities are generally considered "bads" by citizens and are
characterized by the NIMBY (Not-In-My-Back-Yard)

syndrome.

As a group,

citizens generally do not identify with or take pride in solid waste facilities or
services.

As a result, management of solid waste is a very hot issue for

many elected officials charged with compliance with the 1991 Solid Waste
Management Act.

Thus, there is a degree of political risk involved in

decision-making with respect to regionalization.
cooperation to mean importation of out-of-county

If citizens perceive regional
waste or to mean siting a

regional disposal facility "in their backyard", whether it is true or not, then
elected officials likely face political turmoil.

If citizens expect cooperation to

translate into higher costs in the form of user fees or increased taxes or
reduced services, then the political risk to the decision maker may be
significant.
There is also some political uncertainty associated with
multijurisdictional

planning.

There is some non-zero probability that a

county will invest time and money into developing a multi-county
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plan and

then some unforseen event, likely political in nature, will cause the region to
disband.

While the probability may be low, the associated penalty would be

high. Not only would the county have invested heavily and have no
workable plan, costing the taxpayers money, but they may also be subject
to heavy penalties for noncompliance and/or may incur significantly

higher

costs of beginning anew and rushing to meet deadlines.
One way to measure the degree of political risk associated with
forming a multi-county

solid waste region is through the variable COMM,

which indicates the number of elected county commissioners in that county.
It is expected that as the number of commissioners increases, political risk is
shared and each individual elected official bears less of the burden of
political heat. Large commissions may feel political safety in numbers.
Larger commissions are also more likely to use a committee structure.
When decisions are made through specialized committees,

it is likely that

committee members have more expertise in that particular area, and they
may also be more likely to seek expert advice and outside professional
opinions.

Similarly, votes in a committee aren't as definitive as votes in a

full commission, and it is less likely that a few politically powerful
commissioners can dominate the entire commission.

It is likely that issues

such as solid waste receive more discussion through committees,
are fewer small group, dark room decisions.

Large commissions are also

less likely to develop deep schisms among members.
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and there

"Punishment"

in the

form of votes is more difficult with a large commission and it is more
difficult to use vote threats to play political games (Leuthold, 1996).

For

these reasons, it is expected that as commission size increases, political
costs are reduced, thus a positive relationship exists between the number of
county commissioners and joining a multi-county

solid waste region.

While COMM may capture some of the political risk within a county,
counties also consider the political risk associated with potential regional
partners.

The variable COMMCC attempts to measure this risk by indicating

the number of county commissioners in the neighboring county with the
largest county commission.

If at least one county has a large commission,

then they may also face lower political risk, which would make them

( 1)

more desirable to the decision making county, and (2) more likely to also
choose a cooperation strategy.

Thus the expected sign is positive.

As was discovered in the case studies, risk (both autonomy and
political) and transaction costs were reduced in some cases where ( 1)
certain institutional structures were in place that facilitated cooperation,
such as an aggressive, pro-active development district that pushed
cooperation,

(2) potential partners had successful past experience with

cooperation, or (3) a cooperation entrepreneur was willing to shoulder
individually much of the effort required to reduce risk and lower transaction
costs.

Ideally, one would like to capture the impacts of these influences in

a statistical model. However, no variables were available to measure these
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influences.

One possible measure is a variable indicating membership in a

particular development district or region, however, numerous attempts to
construct such a variable all resulted in statistical problems with
multicollinearity.

In a regression of membership in a particular development

district on characteristic variables of counties, it was discovered that
individual characteristics
development district.

are highly related to membership in a given

Thus, the impact of membership in a particular

development district is captured in an array of variables indicating own
county characteristics.
E Minimum Service Level Constraint
In addition to federally mandated Subtitle D landfill requirements, each
county must also comply with a host of state-mandated

minimum service

level requirements with respect to solid waste management in accordance
with the 1991 Act.

Some of these requirements include assurance of a

minimum-level collection service available to at least 90% of all households,
a minimum level recycling opportunity

available to all households, 10-year

disposal capacity assurance, and solid waste education.

Some counties

already exceeded these minimum requirements prior to passage of the Act,
while some counties did not meet any requirements.

The more effort

required on the part of a county to meet state-mandated
more likely they may be to join a solid waste region.
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requirements, the

Marginal benefits of

cooperation are likely higher for counties with infant solid waste
management programs than for those with well-developed

programs.

The variable %UNMAN may capture the position of a county along a
program development scale.

%UNMAN refers to the percentage of county

waste currently produced that is unmanaged.

Based on per capita solid

waste generation rates developed by the state, each county may determine
its potential waste stream based on population, and then determine the
percentage of this potential waste stream that is currently managed, based
on collection and disposal records.

A higher value for %UNMAN

corresponds to a lower percentage of the potentially produced solid waste
entering the stream of managed waste.

Thus, as %UNMAN increases, a

county has further to go to meet state-mandated service level requirements.
It seems reasonable to expect that counties that are at a similar stage
of program development may benefit from cooperating.

Thus the variable

CCUNMAN measures the absolute value of the difference between the
potential percentage of unmanaged waste in a county and that of its most
similar neighboring county.

A low value of CCUNMAN indicates that at

least one of a county's neighbors faces approximately the same
requirements toward meeting state guidelines for service provision.
Therefore, one would expect a negative sign on the variable, where
cooperation is more likely if at least one contiguous county is in a similar
situation with respect to meeting state service level provision requirements.
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One potential problem with the variables %UNMAN and CCUNMAN is
that they are calculated based on the county population, a fixed generation
rate irrespective of the type of county (e.g., rural, urban, agricultural,
manufacturing),

heavy

and the total solid waste stream for the county, including

both household and commercial solid waste.

It would be possible for a

county without a developed collection and disposal system for household
waste to have a very low (or even negative) %UNMAN indicator if a large
amount of waste is managed by the commercial sector.
E Budget Constraint
Counties are faced with a limited amount of funds to provide all
activities and services demanded by citizens, including solid waste
management, and this budget constraint should be reflected in the model.

It

is expected that counties with higher revenue will be less hindered by new
solid waste requirements, while solid waste requirements will place a larger
burden on counties that are financially strained.

Total county revenue is

based primarily on tax revenue, thus county population and total revenue
are nearly perfectly correlated.

One possible measure of how fiscally

binding the solid waste requirements are to the county is the per capita total
revenue, indicated by the variable PCAPREV. It is expected that a high
PCAPREV will negatively influence a county to join a solid waste region.
Counties with high revenue per capita are more likely to be able to afford
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the expenditures necessary to manage MSW according to state
requirements.
As previously noted, it is not enough for a county to desire
cooperation, but a cooperative solution must be agreed upon by all parties
involved.

The variable PCREVCC is a measure of the per capita revenue of

the neighboring county with the lowest per capita revenue, and it is an
attempt to measure the desire of surrounding counties to cooperate with a
decision making county.

For the same reasons hypothesized above, a

county with a low per capita revenue stream is more likely to desire a
cooperative outcome.

Thus, having a neighboring county with a low per

capita revenue stream is likely to make them desire cooperation also. So
one would expect cooperation to be inversely related to PCREVCC.

The

higher the per capita revenue of the contiguous county with the lowest
revenue value, the less likely they are to desire multi-county

cooperation.

3. ESTIMATION RESULTS

A Binary Choice Model
Results of the probit estimation may be found in Table 2. In the first
specification,
included.

only variables indicating own county characteristics

are

While the theory and case studies suggest that both own

characteristics

and others' characteristics combine to influence the

cooperation outcome, it is useful to examine the decision as a function of
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Table 2.

Probit Estimation Results. (Dependent variable: JOIN )

VARIABLE

Own Characteristic Spec.

-0.59
(-0.30)

INTERCEPT
POP

-0.005
(-1.31)

-0.005
(-1.12)
-0.003*
(-1.86)

POPCC
%URBAN

Own & Others' Spec.

0.02 ..
(2.18)

0.03**
(2.14)
0.03**
(2.32)

%URBCC
MINPOP

0.15
(1.02)

INCDIFF

0.00003
(0.14)

COMM

0.05*
(1.65)

-0.07
(-1.35)

COMMCC
SUBDLF

-0.91**
(2.82)

0.02**
(2.65)

CCUNMAN
PCAPREV

0.02**
(2.18)
0.007
(0.37)

-0.002*
(-1.70)

PCREVCC
Log-Likelihood

-0.86**
(-2.38)
0.35
(0.44)

%CCLF
%UNMAN

0.08**
(2.06)

-0.002
(-1.39)
-0.0006
(-0.32)

-53.36

-49.35

% O's Correct (of 50)

66% (33)

74% (37)

% 1's Correct (of 45)

64% (29)

69% (31)

Correct Predictions (of 95)

65% (62)

72% (68)

Numbers in parentheses represent the ratio of a coefficient to its asymptotic standard error.
* denotes significance at a = 0.10.
** denotes significance at a = 0.05.
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own characteristics

alone, initially.

According to the theoretical model

developed, counties first assess characteristics of other as a function of
their own characteristics,

and then the characteristics

values based on these own characteristics.

of others are assigned

All variables in the first

specification display the expected sign and all are statistically

significant at

least at the 10% level, except county population, POP. Counties that are
more urban, have larger county commissions, and manage a lower
percentage of their potentially generated waste are more likely to form a
multi-county

region for solid waste management.

If a county has a Subtitle

D landfill and currently manages a high percentage of their potentially
generated waste, then they are less likely to join a multi-county
region.

solid waste

Counties with a high level of per capita revenue are less likely to

join a multi-county

solid waste region. This specification

predicts 66% of

counties forming a single-county region correctly, and predicts formation of
a multi-county

region with 64% accuracy.

Overall, the model predicts 65%

of the responses correctly.
The other probit model specified predicts formation of a multi-county
region as a function of the same own county characteristics,
characteristics

of other counties.

In this specification,

and also

the only variables

that are significant at a minimum level of 10% are POPCC, %URBCC, and
PCREVCC, and each exhibits the expected sign. If a neighboring county has
a high population, then a county is less likely to be observed as part of a
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multi-county

region. This emphasizes the dynamic nature of the final

outcome, where a county would choose to cooperate with another county
with a large population to take advantage of operational cost savings due to
economies of scale. But since the other potential partners must also make
that same decision for cooperation to be observed, this model indicates that
existence of a neighboring county with a high population actually makes a
cooperation outcome less likely to be observed.

In other words, if a

neighboring county has a very high population, then they may be able to
take advantage of scale economies independently, and thus less willing to
cooperate, regardless of the decision making county's desire to cooperate.
The measure of "urban-ness" of contiguous counties, %URBCC is
positive and significant.

This indicates that if a decision making county has

at least one neighboring county that is very urban, then cooperation may be
facilitated by the reduced transaction costs the urbanality of the neighboring
county affords.

The lower the per capita revenue of the contiguous county

with the lowest per capita revenue, the higher the probability that
cooperation will be observed.

This may be an indicator of the willingness of

a neighboring county to accept the costs of cooperation (i.e., risk,
transaction costs), out of financial desperation.

Overall, this model predicts

64% of the responses correctly, with 72% of single-county
predicted accurately, and 56% of multi-county
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regions

regions predicted accurately.

Table 3 reports marginal effects of changes in variables significant in
the fourth model specified.

Overall, the probability of forming a multi

county region was found to be 46%.

By far, the variable contributing

most to the join decision is the presence of a landfill.

the

If a county that does

not have a Subtitle D landfill sites a landfill in their county, the probability of
joining a multi-county

region would decrease from 61 % to 29%, a decrease

in probability of 32% 4 . A one standard deviation increase in the population
of the largest contiguous county increases the probability of forming a multi
county solid waste region by over 21 % . An increase in the percentage of
the county classified as urban by one standard deviation significantly
increases the probability of joining a multi-county

region, from 46% to 71 %.

A similar result is achieved by increasing the urban percentage of the
contiguous county with the highest percentage classified as urban.
Increasing the number of county commissioners by one standard deviation
increases the probability of joining by 16%, while decreasing the potential
percentage of unmanaged waste decreases the probability of joining by
almost 16%.

Perhaps a more meaningful consideration for the %UNMAN

variable is a reduction from 31 % (the state-wide average) to 10%, as

4

Since SUBDLF is a discrete variable only taking on 0/1 values, marginal
impacts are calculated at both SUBDLF = 0 and SUBDLF = 1 levels to allow
probability comparison.
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Table 3.

Marginal Effects of Variables in Probit Specification #2,
Estimated at Variable Means.

Variable

~

Mean

Std Dev

Variable Change

Change in
Probability
of Joinina

POPCC

-0.003

144.7

168.3

Increases one
standard
deviation

-0.2142

24.26

Increases one
standard
deviation

0.2466

0.2827

0.1575

%URBAN

0.026

28.81

%URBCC

0.034

59.54

20.8

Increases one
standard
deviation

COMM

0.079

17.73

5.00

Increases one
standard
deviation

SUBDLF

-0.857

0.43

0.498

%UNMAN

0.016

30.91

24.08
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Changes from 0
to 1
Decreases one
standard
deviation

-0.3270
-0.1567

required by the Act, which causes a reduction in the probability of joining of
13%, from 46% to 33%.
The predictive results of the second probit model specified, where the
decision to form a multi-county
others' characteristics,

solid waste region is a function of own and

are presented in Figure 19. The model attempts to

capture the influences of other counties' decisions on the final cooperation
outcome by including characteristics of surrounding counties as a factor in a
county's decision.

Figure 19, however, provides evidence that the model is

not able to fully capture this dynamic aspect of the situation.
Union County was predicted to form a multi-county

region.

the contiguous counties were predicted to form single-county

For example,
But all five of
regions.

If

the model were able to fully account for decisions made by other counties,
counties predicted to form multi-county
clusters.

regions would have to occur in

The opposite situation occurs in Dyer County, where it is

predicted to form a single-county region, while all contiguous counties are
predicted to form multi-county

regions. With full information regarding

other counties, it would appear that if all contiguous counties desired
cooperation, then the central county would likely face lower costs of
cooperation.
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County was predicted to form and actually formed a single-county solid waste
region
County was predicted to form and actually formed a multi-county solid waste region

~

County was predicted to form a multi-county region and actually formed a single-county
solid waste region

,-,~4 County was predicted to form a single-county
solid waste region

region and actually formed a multi-county
.

Figure 19. Predicted and actual solid waste regions in Tennessee

B Poisson Madel
In addition to the binary choice model, poisson and negative binomial
models were specified, in which the actual number of partners a county
chose in forming solid waste regions was predicted.

In the poisson model,

the dependent variable is NUMJOIN, which has five possible outcomes:
NUMJOIN = 0 if the county joined no others in forming a solid waste region,
NUMJOIN = 1 if the county joined one other county, NUMJOIN = 2 if the
county joined two other counties, NUMJOIN = 3 if the county joined three
other counties, and NUMJOIN = 9 if the county joined nine other counties.
A fundamental assumption of a poisson model is that the mean is equal to
the variance.

If this assumption does not hold, then the model is

overdispersed, or the variance is greater than the mean. In the case of
overdispersion,

a negative binomial model is more appropriate.

A poisson

model is a type of count data model where the dependent variable may take
on one of a predetermined set of discrete values; or the data fit into one of
several predetermined categories.

Significance is placed on the value of the

dependent variable in a poisson model; in this case, comparing a single
county region to a two-county

region is not equivalent to comparing a two

county region to a three county region.
Of the 95 Tennessee counties, 50 single-county
two counties joined to form a two-county

regions were formed,

region, 21 counties formed three

county regions, 12 counties became part of a four-county
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region, and one

ten-county

region formed.

More than half of the counties chose to join no

other counties and to form a single-county region, thus it is crucial that the
join/not join decision be accurately characterized in the poisson model.

For

this reason, the rationale for inclusion of the variables in the best binary
probit specification

holds similarly in this case. Of the available data, no

other variables were identified that may contribute to explaining the
"degree" of cooperation, so the model uses the same specification
fourth binary choice model.

as the

Results of the poisson and negative binomial

models are reported in Table 4.
The first model includes all observations, and all five region outcomes
observed in Tennessee.
coefficient,

As seen by the significance of the alpha

the poisson model is overdispersed by a factor of 0.56.

That is,

the variance is 0.56 times larger than the mean. So for this specification
and this data, the more appropriate model is the negative binomial, which
corrects for overdispersion.

It is the negative binomial model that is

reported in the first column of Table 4. The variable POPCC is significant
and negative, as expected.

As population of the largest contiguous county

increases, a county is likely to join a smaller solid waste region. This
interpretation

is intuitive, since the larger the contiguous neighbor, the

fewer counties would be required to reach some threshold population level
to allow economies of scale advantages.
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The variables %URBAN,

Table 4.

VARIABLE

Poisson and Negative Binomial Models.
(Dependent variable NUMJOIN = 0, 1, 2, 3, 9)

NEGATIVE BINOMIAL MODEL
(all observations)

POISSON MODEL
(dropping NUMJOIN = 9
observations)

CONSTANT

0.0005
(0.00)

-3.40*
(-1.78)

POP

-0.006
(-0.15)

-0.011 *
(-1.62)

-0.004**
(-2.40)

-0.0008
(-0.56)

%URBAN

0.02*
(1.70)

0.02
(1.48)

%URBCC

0.05**
(2.98)

0.001
(0.09)

MINPOP

0.21
(1.31)

-0.03
(-0.26)

INCDIFF

-0.00008
(-0.32)

-0.0001
(-0.52)

COMM

-0.008
(-0.21 l

0.10**
(3.16)

COMMCC

-0.1 O*
(-1.84)

0.07
(1.16)

SUBDLF

-0.30
(-0.83)

-0.80**
(-2.53)

%CCLF

0.05
(0.05)

0.07
(0.11)

%UNMAN

0.02**
(2.14)

0.006
(1.06)

CCUNMAN

0.02
(0.92)

0.01
(0.87)

PCAPREV

-0.002
(-1.05)

-0.0009
(-0.79)

PCREVCC

-0.00009

-0.0006

POPCC

(-0.04)

(-0.56)

a

0.75**
(2.32)

0.01
(0.06)

Log Likelihood

-148.55

-99.45

# Observations

95

85

Numbers in parentheses represent the ratio of a coefficient to its asymptotic standard error.
• denotes significance at a = 0.10.
• • denotes significance at a = 0.05.
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%URBCC, and %UNMAN are significant and positive, as expected.

As each

of these variables increases, a county is more likely to join a larger solid
waste region.
negative.

One difference, however, is that COMM is significant,

but

Previously, binary choice models indicated that a county was

more likely to join a multi-county solid waste region as commission size
increases.

This model indicates that as commission size increases, counties

are likely to join solid waste regions with fewer participating counties.
The second model presented in Table 4 drops the largest category of
responses (NUMJOIN
overdispersion.

=

9) as an alternative method of correcting for

As evidenced by the low alpha coefficient

and its lack of

statistical significance, the poisson model is appropriate in this case. In this
model, POP and SUBDLF are significant and negatively related to the size of
the region joined.

An increase in population, or the incidence of a Subtitle D

landfill, makes a county more likely to join a smaller solid waste region, as
expected. %URBAN and COMM are statistically significant and positively
related to the size of region the county joins, as expected.
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CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSIONS

1. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

A Theoretical Madel
This research has developed a theoretical random utility model
allowing examination of the process by which individual jurisdictions

will

cooperate with neighboring jurisdictions in the management of municipal
solid waste.

Conditioned upon their own characteristics,

each county

chooses an optimal level of solid waste services, characteristics
cooperating partners, and other goods and services.

of potential

This optimal level of

utility is then compared to that achievable with feasible region arrangements
to minimize the difference between optimal and achievable alternative levels.
The regional arrangement that minimizes the utility difference is then
selected as the county's choice for formation of a solid waste region. This
choice may be to form a single-county region, or it may be to join one or
more neighboring counties to jointly form a solid waste region.

All counties

are making decisions regarding region preferences simultaneously.

If the

region strategy that minimizes a county's utility difference involves other
counties, then the county enters into a process of negotiation with potential
partners.

This negotiation may involve tradeoffs where a county is required
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to reduce transaction costs or risks faced by potential cooperating

partners

in order to achieve a final region outcome that leaves each participating
county no worse off than their initially chosen feasible strategy.

B Case Studies
To examine the way in which cooperation in forming solid waste
regions was achieved in Tennessee, five individual regions were selected for
case study.

In addition to looking at the process by which regions were

formed, the case studies also provide further insight into the management of
solid waste under alternative regional arrangements.
formed single-county
a ten-county

regions, one formed a three-county

region, and one formed a three-county

form a single-county

Of the five cases, two

region and a two-county

region, one formed

region that later split to

region.

This section

summarizes the findings of the individual cases as they relate to the
theoretical model and other contributions

from the broader literature.

Operational Costs

In all cases, operational costs played a significant role in the decision
process, and in the resulting management of MSW However, the way in
which individual cases assimilated cost information into the decision process
varied greatly.

The cases have shown that the manner in which operational

cost projections are communicated to decision makers, the source from
which they are communicated,

and the degree of acceptance on the part of
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decision makers have direct implications for the decision process.
Southeast Tennessee case provides an example of effectively
potential cost savings from a credible source.

The

communicated

The development district,

with the trust and respect of all member counties, presented potential cost
savings to individual county commissions through short, easy to understand
written summaries containing quantitative estimates, and accompanied by a
seminar-type presentation.

These estimates were widely accepted by

individual commissions, and were cited as the primary reason why member
counties chose to join the Southeast Tennessee Solid Waste Region. The
time required and educational effort required to gain acceptance varied
among member counties, but even in the case of one county where the cost
estimates were initially disbelieved, persistent education efforts eventually
led to acceptance.
On the other end of the spectrum, the Scott County case provided an
example of a decision process absent wide acceptance of future operational
cost estimates.

While crude estimates of future costs under alternative

scenarios were available to some decision makers, there was widespread
denial about the degree to which Subtitle D regulations and state legislated
MSW regulations would be binding.

The degree of doubt was great enough

that potential operational cost savings were essentially discounted when the
region formation decision was being made. Since that time, information
regarding true costs has been very effectively communicated through actual
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fiscal strain.

Now that potential operational cost savings are being

considered by decision makers responsible for the handling of MSW, they
are considering cooperation as a strategy to address MSW management.
For decision makers to embrace cooperation as a waste management
strategy, potential operational cost savings due to economies of scale in
disposal have to be not only available, but also effectively

communicated

and widely accepted.

Transaction Costs
Several elements of the individual cases contributed
understanding

toward an

of how transaction costs influence the decision making

process and resultant solid waste management practices.

A history of

cooperation among potential partners, even if the outcome was less than
satisfactory,
formation,
cases.

aids in reducing transaction costs associated with region
as was evidenced by the Inter-local and Southeast Tennessee

Past cooperative efforts build relationships of trust and comraderie.

They also reveal goals, norms, and values of potential cooperative
which lower transaction costs.
entrepreneur(s)

partners,

An individual(s) serving as a cooperation

reduces transaction costs by taking charge of the tempo of

the decision process and serving as a focus point for new interest, as was
the case in the Inter-local Authority.

Similarly, transaction

minimized in the presence of an institutional
serves as a cooperation cornerstone,

costs are

arrangement in place that

as was the role of the development
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district in the Southeast Tennessee Region. An institutional

arrangement

with the resources required to evaluate options, coordinate meetings,
establish cooperation rules, and resolve conflict, while maintaining full trust
and confidence of members, significantly

reduces transaction costs.

Homogeneity among potential participants, or perception of homogeneous
problems, also reduces transaction costs, as evidenced by the Inter-local
and Benton-Carroll-Henry

cases. Conversely, if the institutional

decision making is restricted to a narrowly defined framework,

structure for
as was the

case in Cocke County, transaction costs are higher.
The formality of the legal bond among partners may influence
transaction costs in different ways.

Higher initial transaction costs may be

required to develop a formal legal commitment,

as did the Inter-local

\

Authority.

But in the long run, existence of a tight bond may actually

reduce transaction costs associated with re-education, continuity,
conflict resolution.

and

This temporal tradeoff is also evidenced by the loose

arrangements of the Southeast Tennessee and Benton-Carroll-Henry
Regions. The Southeast Tennessee Region invested heavily in transaction
costs associated with defining the flexible arrangement they desired.
Benton-Carroll-Henry
initially.

The

Region invested minimally in defining their relationship

The initial investment in transaction costs associated with

establishing the agreement were negatively related to the transaction costs
required in the long run in both cases. Thus, a temporal tradeoff of
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transaction costs appears with respect to transaction costs invested is
establishing formal ties.

High transaction costs invested early, whether the

arrangement is for a tight or loose bond, may reduce future transaction
costs associated with conflict resolution, education, and continuity.
The private sector influences transaction costs associated with the
decision process and management of MSW, although the role of the private
sector may be to either increase or decrease transaction costs.

The Cocke

County Region is an example of how the private sector may reduce
transaction costs associated with cooperation,
serves as a neutral third party facilitating
neighboring counties.

where the private sector

informal cooperation

In the case of the Inter-local Authority,

between two
the private

sector has actually increased transaction costs by attempting to lure
individual entities in the authority into breach of contract.

Political Risk
One factor that appears to minimize political risk associated with
cooperation is past experience in a successful cooperative effort, as
evidenced by the Southeast Tennessee Region. Decision makers involved in
the decision process had confidence and trust in the intentions and abilities
of potential partners, based on past experience, so their individual political
risk was reduced.

While use of a formal commitment

to establish regional

arrangements may increase political risk in the short run, it reduces political
risk in the long run. In the Inter-local Authority,
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decision makers accepted a

high level of risk by forming the authority and making a sizable financial
commitment to the effort.

But in the long run, this commitment

reduced the

political risk to a tolerable level even in the issue of siting a regional landfill.
The converse was evidenced by the Benton-Carroll-Henry

case, where little

risk was accepted initially, when no formal binding commitments
to regional agreements.

But in the long run, overwhelming

were made

political risk

resulted when the boundaries of the region's authority were called into
question among heated debate on sensitive issues.
The cases also revealed that the perception of equal representation on
solid waste boards, and equal distribution of costs and benefits among
entities under a board reduces political risk. Another factor that contributed
toward reducing political risk was shown to be homogeneity among
potential partners, where Scott County and Cocke County perceived the
political risk associated with potential loss of autonomy to be related to their
perceived differences in goals and values of neighboring counties.

Finally,

institutional arrangements that spread political risk over a large number of
individuals appear to reduce risk levels.
Loss of Autonomy

Individual entities perceive autonomy differently and value autonomy
differently.

For some jurisdictions,

such as Cocke County or Rhea County

(in the Southeast Tennessee Region), existence of and autonomy over a
disposal facility may be extremely important factors in the decision process.
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For others, such as Scott County, autonomy may be highly valued until
financial strain begins to raise the level of political risk, and then the impact
of an autonomy loss is reduced to a level that causes them to actually
relinquish nearly all autonomy over a facility.

The flexibility of regional

arrangements may also influence the perception of autonomy.

In the

Southeast Tennessee case, member counties perceived that the loose
agreement they negotiated ensured autonomy for individual interests.
Conversely, in the Inter-local Authority,
tightly-constructed

member counties perceived that the

agreement they negotiated ensured autonomy for the

authority as a whole.
Service Level and Budget Constraints
The Benton-Carroll-Henry

case provides an example of how a binding

service level constraint can encourage multi-county

cooperation.

In this

case, all three counties perceived a similar collection problem: each would
have to move from their current level of collection service (green box and
some private pick-up) to a mandatory household pick-up in order to meet
the state's collection requirement.

Since all three counties would be

pursuing the same path toward compliance with the collection mandate,
they recognized potential gains in negotiating a joint solution to their similar
collection problems.

Another example of the influence of a binding service

level constraint on the willingness to cooperate is provided by Giles County,
in the Inter-local Authority.

Giles County was not one of the initial target
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counties identified as a potential cooperating partner.

But when they were

eventually approached about the possibility of cooperating, the significant
changes they would be required to make to their existing solid waste service
program to bring it into compliance with state guidelines was a major
contributing

factor to their decision to join the authority.

Similarly, a binding budget constraint was also shown to influence
cooperation decisions.

In Scott County, cooperation was only considered

(informal cooperation brokered by a private firm) when fiscal strain became
significant.

In this case, it appears that the value placed on political and

autonomy risk is a function of the degree to which the budget constraint is
binding.

Scott County was adamant about maintaining autonomy and

minimizing political risk, until they could no longer "afford" this luxury, and
then accepted an increased level of autonomy and political risk in return for
some relief of the fiscal strain.

c

Statistical Models
The theory was then applied to the decision Tennessee counties made

in 1991 regarding solid waste region formation.

Information learned in the

case studies was useful in identifying variables representing the
characteristics
process.

(both own and others') that may contribute to the decision

The case studies were also useful in developing hypotheses about

the effect of certain characteristics

on the decision.
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Statistical models were

developed to predict formation of a multi-county

solid waste region.

Probit

models predicted the decision with 72% accuracy.
Operational Costs

Variables indicating the population of the county and the population
of the largest contiguous county were included in an attempt to measure the
influence of potential operational cost savings due to economies of scale.
As expected, population appears to be negatively related to the decision to
cooperate, although it is not statistically significant.

From an own county

perspective, existence of highly populous neighboring counties would make
cooperation desirable in order to take advantage of potential scale
economies.

However, the statistical significance and negative sign of the

variable indicating population of the largest contiguous county highlights the
process involved in forming a cooperative region.

Not only does the

decision making county have to desire cooperation, but so do all other
potential cooperating partners.

This variable indicates that a large

population in neighboring counties makes those counties less likely to form
a multi-county

region, and thus the decision making county is also less likely

to form a multi-county

region.

Transaction Costs

Transaction costs were shown to be important through the statistical
significance and positive sign of variables indicating the percentage of the
county classified as urban and the percentage urban of the neighboring

179

county with the highest percentage urban. These variables indicate that
some of the institutional structures and information exchanges, and perhaps
administrative

expertise associated with more urban counties aid in reducing

transaction costs and thus encouraging formation of a multi-county

region.

One would certainly expect transaction costs to be related to the number of
individual entities involved in cooperation.

However, a variable indicating

the minimum number of counties required to achieve a minimum threshold
population did not appear related to the decision, nor did a variable
attempting to capture homogeneity among contiguous counties.

As noted

in the case studies, transaction costs may be reduced in the presence of an
institutional

structure or cooperation entrepreneur or cooperation

cornerstone that facilitates cooperation, or with past experience in
cooperating.

However, no variables could be identified to specifically

incorporate these factors.

Since the statistical models are static in nature,

they are also not able to address temporal tradeoffs of transaction costs
associated with region formation and resulting solid waste management.

Political Risk and Autonomy Risk
A variable indicating the number of county commissioners was
statistically

significant and positive, indicating that larger commissions may

be able to spread political risk, making multi-county

cooperation more likely.

The variable intended to capture political risk associated with potential
cooperation partners, although not statistically significant,
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was positive as

expected.

However, when a model predicting the size of the region a

county would join was estimated, the variable representing the number of
commissioners was negative.

This suggests that while having a large

commission makes a county more likely to cooperate, it may make
cooperation in a large region less likely. The most significant influence on
participation

in a multi-county

solid waste region was identified as presence

of a Subtitle D landfill, or firm plans to construct or upgrade to a Subtitle D
facility.

As shown in the case studies, autonomy risk is often perceived as

the risk of importing waste.

If a county had its own disposal facility, they

were much less likely to cooperate because they may perceive cooperation
as a loss of control over this facility.

However, if a large percentage of

surrounding counties also had a landfill, a county appeared more likely to
form a multi-county

region, although the variable was not statistically

significant.

Service Level and Budget Constraints
Although variables included in the model to capture the influence of
service level and budget constraints were not statistically

significant, they

do have the hypothesized signs. The decision to form a multi-county

solid

waste region appears to be positively related to the degree to which a solid
waste service level constraint is binding, based on a variable indicating the
potential percentage of the waste stream currently unmanaged.

The

outcome also appears positively related the degree to which the binding
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constraint is similar for contiguous counties.

A binding budget constraint,

as indicated by a low level of per capita revenue, appears to make a county
more likely to cooperate, as does a binding budget constraint in at least one
neighboring county.
It should be emphasized, however, that the statistical models
estimated examine only the decision Tennessee counties made by a
predetermined deadline with respect to cooperation in planning.
joined a multi-county

If a county

solid waste region to develop a 10-year region plan,

they were in no way required to cooperate in an operational sense. There
are very real differences between cooperation in planning and cooperation in
action.

Joint planning typically precedes joint action; however, joint

planning does not imply joint action.
management may be synonymous.
unrelated.

To some counties, planning and
To others, they may be almost

A statistical model cannot specifically address this issue. The

only thing that can be concluded about counties forming a multi-county
solid waste region is that they filed a multi-county

solid waste plan in

accordance with state guidelines.

2. POLICY IMPLICATIONS
As noted in Chapter I, the economics of landfill disposal of MSW,
waste reduction and recycling goals or mandates, and planning requirements
are causing many local governments to consider cooperation in solid waste
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management.

In several states, as in Tennessee, recent legislation has

required local governments to consider joint provision of some or all solid
waste services.

This research is important in identifying conditions under

which cooperation is feasible, factors that contribute toward successful
cooperation in solid waste management, and policies and institutional
arrangements that facilitate cooperation.
First, it is important to note that cooperation is not desirable in every
situation.

Operational cost savings associated with disposal are generally

available to most local governments through cooperation with neighboring
entities.

However, each individual local government responsible for

provision of MSW management services has a complex utility function they
seek to maximize.

Included in this function are nonmonetary considerations

such as political risk and autonom

levels. Also included are transaction

costs associated with cooperation that are difficult to quantify.

There may

be situations where fiscal considerations alone would justify cooperation,
but consideration of other utility influences associated with cooperation
would cause cooperation to be a suboptimal outcome.

Thus, policies

designed to impose cooperation upon local governments based purely on
fiscal considerations will not necessarily produce optimal results for the
management of MSW.
There are certain characteristics

of local jurisdictions that may reduce

transaction costs, reduce political risk, or reduce autonomy losses
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associated with multi ·urisdictional cooperation in solid waste management.
These include past experience cooperating in MSW management or on other
issues, presence of a cooperation entrepreneur or a cooperation
cornerstone, and homogeneity among potential partners.

Another aspect of

cooperation facilitation is having policies and institutional

arrangements in

place that encourage cooperation by clearly communicating

benefits of

cooperation and reducing transaction costs, political risk, or autonomy
losses associated with cooperation.

One of these policies is sufficient time

for educating decision makers about alternatives and allowing exploration of
alternative options.
formation.

Another is a policy designed to allow flexibility

Individual jurisdictions

in region

need to be able to tailor agreements to

minimize costs operating as a barrier to cooperation.
monetary incentives for multijurisdictional

Policies including

cooperation are only effective if

the particular constraint they attempt to relieve is binding.

One institutional

arrangement that facilitates successful cooperation is establishment of an
efficient communication
encouraging cooperation.

link between local decision makers and entities
The requirements of the policies must be clearly

defined and local decision makers must be educated with respect to these
policies and their implications.

To the extent possible, taking the decision

making process out of the political realm will also facilitate cooperation.
Policies and institutions sensitive to the conditions required for successful
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cooperation can lead to more efficient provision of MSW services, and can
also facilitate cooperation in other issues.
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